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INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Judicial Independence in
International Tribunals
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo
Some international tribunals, such as the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal
and the trade-dispute panels set up under GATT, are "dependent" in the
sense that the judges are appointed by the state parties for the purpose of
resolving a particular dispute. If the judges do not please the state parties,
they will not be used again. Other international tribunals, such as the
International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
and the new International Criminal Court, are "independent" in the sense
that the judges are appointed in advance of any particular dispute and
serve fixed terms. The conventional wisdom, which is based mainly on the
European experience, is that independent tribunals are more effective at
resolving disputes than are dependent tribunals. We argue that the evi-
dence does not support this view, and, moreover, that the evidence is more
consistent with the contrary thesis: the most successful tribunals are de-
pendent. We also argue that the European Court of Justice is not a good
model for international tribunals because it owes its success to the high
level of political and economic unification among European states. We
conclude with skeptical predictions about the International Criminal Court
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the newest
international tribunals.
INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, international dispute resolution has assumed an
unprecedented prominence in international politics. Linked in the interwar
years to quixotic efforts to achieve peace through nonviolent settlement of
disputes, international courts proliferated in the aftermath of World War II,
with a noticeable acceleration after the end of the Cold War. Now, inter-
national courts issue binding decisions that solve multibillion dollar trade
disputes between the world's major powers. They enforce the laws of the
sea involving matters ranging from seizure of ships to law enforcement
searches to the use of seabed resources. They may have been a crucial
force behind the integration of Europe into a single economic and political
unit. International courts even seek to protect the basic human rights of
2005]
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citizens against their own governments and to punish war criminals
throughout the world.I
International courts have also affected American foreign and domestic
policy. Appellate panels of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have
ruled that favorable tax treatment for American exporters and American
tariffs on steel imports are illegal.2 At the end of 2003, President Bush ter-
minated the steel tariffs, and Congress was considering new legislation to
bring the tax code into harmony with WTO requirements. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has issued multiple judgments against
the United States with respect to the execution of foreign nationals.4
Although the U.S. Supreme Court and involved states have long refused to
delay executions to allow international law claims to be raised, this may be
changing.5 More than one hundred nations throughout the world have
joined the International Criminal Court (ICC), pledging themselves to
bring war criminals to justice wherever they are found. While the United
States has rejected the ICC because it violates due process standards and
separation of powers, it has been forced to wage a vigorous diplomatic
campaign to immunize its citizens from the court's reach.6
Prominent Americans have criticized the move toward formal interna-
tional adjudication as a threat to American values and U.S. foreign policy.
Under Secretary of State John Bolton has criticized the ICC as "an
organization that runs contrary to fundamental American precepts and
basic constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, checks and balances,
and national independence."7 Judge Robert Bork sees international courts
as institutions that inexorably expand liberal ideologies:
I. See generally Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The
Piece of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INrT'L L. & PoL. 709 (2000).
2. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248, 249, 251-254, 258, & 259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003), http://
www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu._e/248_259_abr-e.doc (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) (regarding steel
tariffs); WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales
Corporations, WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/WT/DS/108abr.doc (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) (regarding tax treatment).
3. See President's Statement on Steel (Dec. 4, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/12/20031204-5.html (last visited May 20, 2004).
4. See, e.g., LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 40 1.L.M. 1069 (June 27, 2001); Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
5. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1997); Adam Liptak, Mexico Awaits Hague Ruling
on Citizens on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at Al ("Oklahoma attorney general asked a state
appeals court in November to stay execution 'out of courtesy' to the international court.").
6. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 200 (2003); see also U.S. Department of State's Office of International
Information Programs, Countries Who Have Signed Article 98 Agreements, at http://usinfo.state.gov/
topical/rights/law/03061209.htm (June 12, 2003).
7. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, American
Justice and the International Criminal Court, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute (Nov. 3,
2003), at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/25818.htm (last visited May 16, 2004).
[Vol. 93:1
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As the culture war has become global, so has judicial activism.
Judges of international courts-the [ICJ], the European Court of
Human Rights, and, predictably, the new [ICC], among other
forums-are continuing to undermine democratic institutions and
to enact the agenda of the liberal Left or New Class.
Internationally, that agenda contains a toxic measure of
anti-Americanism.8
In a recent book, Henry Kissinger reflected with dismay that "in less than
a decade, an unprecedented concept has emerged to submit international
politics to judicial procedures." That concept "has spread with
extraordinary speed and has not been subject to systematic debate."9 He
warns that international adjudication "is being pushed to extremes which
risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of governments; historically
the dictatorship of the virtuous has often led to inquisitions and even witch
hunts."'" These views parallel those of international relations scholars of
the realist school, who regard international adjudication as futile and
irrelevant in an anarchic world."
In contrast, international law scholars have welcomed the turn to in-
ternational dispute resolution. 2 Noting the success of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in
achieving compliance with their decisions, Professor Laurence Helfer and
Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter have created a "checklist" of the attributes of
these courts and argue that other international courts should adopt these
same characteristics. 3 They claim that international courts modeled on the
ECJ and ECHR could create "global communities of law," just as the ECJ
and the ECHR have contributed to the establishment of a European legal
community.' 4
What are the attributes of a successful international court? In Helfer
and Slaughter's view, effective international tribunals are independent:
they are composed of senior, respected jurists with substantial terms; they
have an independent fact-finding capacity; their decisions are binding as
8. ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 10 (2003).
9. HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 273 (2002).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L
SECURITY 5 (1995). The older tradition begins with Carr's and Morgenthau's critique of interwar
international legalism. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919 - 1939 (1962);
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1 st ed. 1948).
12. The conventional wisdom is described in ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 202-07
(1995), though these authors register skepticism.
13. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
14. Id. at 391. Their view is qualified; they do not believe that effective supranational
adjudication is possible unless certain domestic conditions are met.
2005]
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international law; they make decisions on the basis of "principle rather than
power"; and they engage in high-quality legal reasoning."
Heifer and Slaughter concede that the success of an international tri-
bunal sometimes depends on factors outside a court's control, including the
relationship of the state parties and their domestic political institutions.16
But advocates of formal international dispute resolution believe that inter-
national adjudication can serve a causal role: it not only reflects existing
international relationships but can also strengthen them. To make this
point, Slaughter and Professors Robert Keohane and Andrew Moravcsik
distinguish interstate dispute resolution, where the adjudicators, their
agenda, and the enforcement of decisions are all subject to veto by the in-
dividual national governments,17 from transnational dispute resolution,
where tribunals are more independent, private parties have access, and do-
mestic legal systems enforce the tribunals' judgments.18 Keohane and his
coauthors argue that "[l]egalization imposes real constraints on state
behavior; the closer we are to transnational third-party dispute resolution,
the greater those constraints are likely to be."' 9 When states move from
interstate dispute resolution to transnational dispute resolution, the increas-
ingly court-like nature of the tribunal leads to stronger ties between the
states.2°
We argue that the story is more complicated than both the skeptics
and the international lawyers have recognized. Contrary to the views of
skeptics like Bork, international adjudication can play a useful role by
enabling states to overcome a limited set of cooperation problems in inter-
national affairs. States in bilateral relationships can obtain a number of
benefits from international tribunals as long as the tribunals are neutral and
render judgments that reflect the interests of the states at the time they
submit the dispute to the tribunal. For example, states that wish to settle a
boundary dispute may prefer a range of adjudicated outcomes to war or
other costly coercive measures. A blanket indictment of international
courts overlooks the helpful functions that they can provide in limited
circumstances.
Despite this argument in favor of international tribunals, we are skep-
tical of the claims of international legal academics. We view tribunals as
simple, problem-solving devices. They do not transform the interests of
15. Id. at 300-14; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
152 (1990); J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26
COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 520-21 (1994).
16. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 13, at 328-36.
17. Robert 0. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, in
LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 73, 84-85 (Judith Goldstein et al. eds., 2001).
18. Id. at 85.
19. Id. at 104. This occurs because more court-like transnational adjudication provides benefits to
groups within states ubject to a tribunal, which increases the costs to governments of noncompliance.
20. See id.
[Vol. 93:1
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states; nor do they cause states to ignore their own interests for the sake of
a transnational ideal. Tribunals are likely to be ineffective when they
neglect the interests of state parties and, instead, make decisions based on
moral ideals, the interests of groups or individuals within a state, or the
interests of states that are not parties to the dispute."'
The difference between our view and the conventional wisdom cen-
ters on the role of tribunal independence. A tribunal is independent when
its members are institutionally separated from the state parties-when they
have fixed terms and salary protection, and the tribunal itself has, by
agreement, compulsory rather than consensual jurisdiction. Conventional
wisdom holds that independence at the international level, like independ-
ence at the domestic level, is the key to the rule of law as well as the suc-
cess of formalized international dispute resolution. We argue, by contrast,
that independent tribunals pose a danger to international cooperation
because they can render decisions that conflict with the interests of state
parties. Indeed, states will be reluctant to use international tribunals unless
they have control over the judges. On our view, independence prevents
international tribunals from being effective.
The goals of this Article are twofold. First, we aim to present the
theoretical case against tribunal independence. We will show that the insti-
tutional setting in which international tribunals operate is fundamentally
different from the one in which domestic courts function. This difference
makes independence an undesirable feature for international tribunals.
Second, we intend to test our theory with empirical observations. We have
collected performance data for several international tribunals: the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACHR), the panel system of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DSM) of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Court of Justice (ECJ),
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Our analysis of the data
shows that greater independence does not improve the performance of
international tribunals and may, in fact, hinder their success.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I describes the history of
international dispute resolution, beginning with international arbitration
and then moving forward to efforts after World Wars I and II to create
permanent international tribunals. We also review contemporary attempts
to increase the number and authority of international courts. Part II presents
our theory of independence. We discuss why states resort to formalized
adjudication to resolve disputes, and, in light of this analysis, examine
what design features of international tribunals make the most sense. Part III
21. For this reason, tribunals should not allow themselves to be influenced by other tribunals that
are set up for different purposes (as advocated in, for example, Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003)).
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analyzes data on the performance of international tribunals and relates their
effectiveness to their design characteristics. Part IV addresses the counter-
examples to our thesis provided by the European experience. Relatively
independent courts in Europe have comparatively high success rates, and
we will explain why this is not inconsistent with our theory. Part V con-
cludes with some tentative predictions about the future of international
adjudication.
Before starting, we should clarify our use of terms. By "tribunal" we
mean any panel of individuals that has the task of resolving a dispute
between states on the basis of international law. The tribunal's job is that
of "international adjudication" or "third-party dispute resolution." A tribu-
nal can be more or less dependent; indeed, dependency is a continuous
variable. A more dependent tribunal is an "arbitrator," and a less dependent
tribunal is a "court." States set up tribunals at many points across the spec-
trum, so we can speak of a tribunal with quasi-arbitrator or quasi-court
characteristics. Our usage does not line up perfectly with international
usage,22 but we rely on it because international usage is not internally
consistent.
I
BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
States can choose from a range of dispute resolution methods that fall
short of force or coercive sanctions. These include diplomacy, mediation or
conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication.23 While the distinctions between
these categories are not sharp, scholars traditionally separate arbitration
and adjudication from negotiation and mediation. The former processes
lead to formally binding decisions based on legal rules, while the latter do
not.24
International lawyers date the modem era of arbitration to the Jay
Treaty of 1795.25 In a traditional arbitration case, two states involved in a
dispute each appointed a single arbitrator, the two arbitrators then jointly
appointed a third, and the three arbitrators heard arguments and delivered a
judgment.26 Hundreds of arbitrations have occurred over the last two centu-
ries, and they continue to the present. For example, the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, which was created to hear and adjust claims for damages
22. See Romano, supra note 1, at 711-23.
23. See generally J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (3d ed. 1998).
24. See id. at 88; see also Christine Gray & Benedict Kingsbury, Inter-State Arbitration Since
1945: Overview and Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 55,
63-68 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992).
25. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 116.
For a discussion of the Jay Treaty, see John Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2071-82 (1999).
26. MERRILLS, supra note 23, at 88-91.
[Vol. 93:1
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arising from the Iranian Revolution in 1979, falls within this tradition and
remains in operation today. 7 Interstate arbitrations have covered a wide
range of disputes, from controversies over borders and damage to property
during wars to collisions between ships at sea.
While different in many respects, international arbitration shares a key
characteristic with international adjudication: reliance on third parties to
resolve a dispute between two states. Third-party dispute resolution has
many attractions, including the introduction of a (theoretically) neutral
body of arbitrators whose views are not colored by interest or passion. 8
Arbitration limits the involvement of the third party: an arbitral panel is set
up to resolve only one dispute or class of disputes, and it follows an ad hoc
set of procedural and substantive laws that remain within the control of the
parties. Arbitration's main weakness is that the disputing states, whose
interests and passions are engaged, need not consent to a panel's jurisdic-
tion; nor need they comply with its judgment, though they frequently do. In
contrast, a full-fledged international court has, among other fea-
tures, (1) compulsory jurisdiction (the court has automatic jurisdiction
over certain classes of disputes); (2) a permanent judiciary whose mem-
bers do not depend on the disputing states for their appointment or salary;
and (3) regular procedures and substantive legal rules that are not renego-
tiated from dispute to dispute.29 In principle, these features should over-
come the weaknesses of arbitration, and are widely viewed as
improvements.
The end of the nineteenth century witnessed the first tentative steps
towards the ideal of formal international adjudication. Delegates to the
Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 agreed to establish a permanent arbi-
tral body, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).30 Given its modest
goal of encouraging states to use arbitration, the PCA provided a set of
procedures for choosing arbitrators from a group of people identified in
advance as potential candidates. Parties did not use the PCA as much as its
advocates hoped, however, and it fell into desuetude. 1
27. See, e.g., David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 129-57 (1990)
(discussing similarities and differences of Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and international
arbitration process).
28. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
29. Cf Richard B. Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International
Adjudication, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, 155-57 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch ed., 1987); MERRILLS, supra note 23, at 293-97 (discussing formal characteristics of
international adjudication).
30. See generally Permanent Court of Arbitration, General Information, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/ENGLISH/GlI (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
31. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 710 (4th ed. 1990). Of the
twenty-five cases considered by the court, it disposed of twenty-one within its first thirty years, and
ruled on only four cases thereafter, with the last one in 1970. William E. Butler, The Hague Permanent
2005]
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The next step was the establishment of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ), which, along with the League of Nations, was
supposed to maintain international order after World War 1.32 The PCIJ's
innovation was an authentic panel of judges, who served for fixed terms; in
theory, they were at least partly independent of the influence of states. In
addition, states could submit to compulsory jurisdiction by making unilat-
eral declarations, and many did. The failure of the League of Nations sys-
tem set the stage for the International Court of Justice, the judicial organ of
the United Nations, which continued in 1946 from where the PCIJ left
off.3 3 The compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ has been more significant than
the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ. As we will discuss, compliance
with ICJ judgments has been more than occasional, but not routine.
At roughly the same time that the ICJ began to operate, drafters were
putting the finishing touches on GATT, a legal framework for international
trade that eventually resulted in a relatively systematic form of arbitra-
tion.34 After several decades of activity, during which 298 cases were
heard, GATT arbitration gave way in 1995 to the more court-like Dispute
Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization.35 Unlike standard
arbitration systems like GATT's, the DSM has compulsory jurisdiction,
and states are (as a practical matter) unable to block the creation of
tribunals and their adjudication of a dispute.
In addition to these "global" courts, several regional courts cropped
up in the latter half of the twentieth century. The European Court of Justice
(1952) resolves disputes arising under European law.36 The European Court
of Human Rights (1959) adjudicates disputes involving the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.37 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979) hears
cases involving the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights.38 Other
Court of Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43, 43-44 (Mark
W. Janis ed., 1992).
32. See Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/
ed/eda/eda1 5e.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
33. See International Court of Justice, General Information, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
ENGLISH/Gil (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
34. GATT came into being in 1947. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A- 1l, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
35. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 273-355, 367-608 (1993).
36. See The Court of Justice of the European Communities, The Institution, at http://
www.curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index-cje.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
37. See European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background, Organization and Procedure,
at http://www.echr.coe.intlEng/General.htm (Sept. 2003).
38. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, History, at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
general-ing/history.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
[Vol. 93:1
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courts deal with human rights and commercial relationships in other parts
of the world.39
Recent developments include the 1996 creation of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which has jurisdiction over a
range of maritime disputes governed by the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).4 ° ITLOS has compulsory jurisdiction and
an independent, permanent group of judges. Another area of growth in in-
ternational adjudication involves war crimes. The Nuremberg tribunal after
World War II was followed, after a long hiatus, by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994).41 All three of these tribunals were
established after the disputed behavior occurred. The drafters of the Rome
Statute of 1998 aspired to turn these episodic judicial interventions into a
permanent court, the International Criminal Court, which would be open to
proceedings brought by a permanent prosecutor.42 This system would be
the most independent to date; it would have compulsory jurisdiction, inde-
pendent judges, and a prosecutor with the authority (with certain excep-
tions) to bring cases against defendants. The ICC has not yet heard its first
case.
In this mass of detail about international dispute resolution we can
identify two trends. First, international tribunals have become more power-
ful as a matter of formal law over time. Compulsory jurisdiction has be-
come more common, and the judiciaries have become more independent of
the states that establish them. Second, international tribunals have become
more diverse, specialized, and, in a sense, fractionalized. Contrary to some
expectations, the world has not moved toward a single judicial system
comparable to a domestic hierarchical judiciary. Instead, jurisdiction is
parceled out to coequal institutions, with no higher appellate authority to
resolve jurisdictional conflicts.43
39. See, e.g., Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, 18 I.L.M. 1203
(1979); Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for the Harmonization of
Corporate Law in Africa, OHADA Overview, at http://www.juriscope.org/infosohada/traite/pdfgb/
presentation-tgb.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2004); see also Romano, supra note 1, at 716-17.
40. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994).
41. See, e.g., U.N. Security Resolution 955, Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994); Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
42. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37
I.L.M. 1002 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited
Aug. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
43. The fragmented development of international courts worries international law scholars who
favor a unitary international legal system but not others. See generally, e.g., Jonathan 1. Charney, Is
International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101
(1998); Robert Jennings, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Development of
2005]
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Fundamental questions underpin these developments in international
adjudication. How do international courts work? Why do states create and
confer jurisdiction on them? Do states obey them, and if so, why? How can
international courts be improved? What explains their popularity and their
fragmentation? In short, why do states use international tribunals? We
tackle these questions and develop our thesis in the next Part of this
Article.
II
INDEPENDENCE AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
A. Independence in the Domestic and International Spheres
As noted in the Introduction, the conventional wisdom is that the
effectiveness of an international court or tribunal is correlated with its in-
dependence and, in general, with the degree to which it has the attributes of
a domestic court. That recent scholarship has made the connection between
effectiveness and independence is understandable. A distinctive feature of
domestic courts in advanced countries is their separation from politics.
While not completely immune to political influence, such courts are less
prone to manipulation by elected officials than are ordinary government
institutions. Domestic courts are, in a word, independent, and that inde-
pendence helps distinguish successful market-based liberal democracies
from authoritarian regimes and failed democracies in which corruption is
the norm and markets are weak."
International law scholars have transferred the logic of independence
from the domestic arena to the international sphere. They argue that when
international tribunals are dependent on the goodwill of particular states,
their judges will be regarded as political, as tools of the various parties, and
not as legitimate.45 Legitimacy can be achieved by granting international
judges a level of independence comparable to that of domestic judges.
Independence exists when judges have fixed terms and are not appointed
by the parties of a dispute; when the judges are not, or are not necessarily,
the nationals of a state party to the dispute; when the judges observe regu-
lar, predetermined rules of procedure; and when stare decisis and other le-
gal conventions are observed. In addition, jurisdiction must be compulsory,
or states will simply deny jurisdiction of a court when they believe they are
likely to lose. This conventional wisdom has intuitive appeal and some
International Environment Protection Law, 1 RECIEL 240 (1992); Philip C. Jessup, Do New Problems
Need New Courts?, 65 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 261 (1971); W. Michael Reisman, The Supervisory
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: International Arbitration and International
Adjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1996).
44. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. EcON. 445 (2004).
45. See Benedict Kingsbury, Neo-Madisonian Global Constitutionalism: Thomas M. Franck's
Democratic Cosmopolitan Prospectus for Managing Diversity and World Order in the Twenty-First
Century, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 291, 296 (2003).
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empirical support. Domestic courts are more successful when judges are
independent-that, anyway, is the American experience.46 In addition, the
most successful supranational court is the ECJ, and that court is relatively
independent. Apparently influenced by these considerations, states have
invented new tribunals, such as the WTO and ICC, which are more
independent than older tribunals.
However, the conventional wisdom overlooks the profound differ-
ences between the settings in which domestic and international courts
operate. Domestic courts play their role within a political system thick with
institutions, including a powerful executive that has a monopoly on force
and a legislature that enacts rules binding on all citizens. Domestic courts
are usually unified, functioning within a legal system that has universal
scope within a state's boundaries and a powerful supreme court at the apex
of the judicial hierarchy. By contrast, international tribunals do not operate
as part of a coherent and unified world government. They exist in an inter-
stitial legal system that lacks a hierarchy, an enforcement mechanism, and
a legislative instrument that allows for centralized change. International
tribunals are more like domestic arbitrators than domestic courts because
nothing prevents disputants from ignoring them if they do not believe that
submitting disputes to tribunals serves their interest.
To understand the significance of these differences, imagine that the
United States had a court system but lacked an executive and a legislature.
People could bring their disputes to the courts, but there would be no
executive to enforce a judgment.47 The courts would only enforce customs,
conventions, and agreements between people. The customs and conven-
tions would be determined by the courts, and disagreement with court in-
terpretations would be futile, since citizens could not appeal to a legislature
to change the law. Although some citizens would occasionally use courts
to resolve private disputes, it is hard to believe that courts would have
much power and legitimacy. The international setting more closely resem-
bles this hypothetical picture than it resembles the modem United States.
Independent judges are tolerated in domestic settings because citizens
who become judges share most of the values and expectations of the politi-
46. See, e.g., John Yoo, Bush v. Gore: In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
775 (2001). More recent scholarship, however, argues that the Supreme Court has been successful
because it has mirrored the prevailing norms in society. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN
COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 160-78 (2000); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the
Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
47. There was once danger that the U.S. Supreme Court might find itself powerless to enforce its
decisions. See I CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 756-61 (1922)
(discussing state resistance to Marshall Court decisions). While the possibility continues to be of
academic interest, it does not appear to be likely today. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 222 (1994) (arguing
that the president's constitutional authority includes discretion to refuse to enforce Supreme Court
decisions, but admitting that the argument is radical).
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cal community. When they do not, they can be removed; deprived of funds;
or regulated through changes in jurisdiction, modification of the laws they
enforce, or appointment of new judges. Trial judges are also controlled by
appellate judges and Supreme Court Justices, who are usually integrated
into the political community. There is no such political community at the
international level acting to keep judges in line. Thus, we think that until
the evidence shows to the contrary, one should interpret the activities of
international adjudicators with caution, and that one should be skeptical of
the claim that states would submit disputes to judges over whom they have
no influence.
B. Why States Use International Tribunals
The characteristics of international tribunals outlined in the previous
section raise several questions. If states do not have to comply with an
adverse judgment, why would they? If they do not comply, why would
other states ever resort to an international tribunal to resolve a dispute?
And if a state that refuses to comply with a judgment incurs some cost like
an injury to its reputation, why would it ever consent to appear before the
court in the first place? Any theory of international adjudication must
answer these questions.
We argue that tribunals can benefit states that seek to cooperate with
each other by providing relatively neutral information about the facts and
law relevant to a particular dispute. This occurs in two settings. First,
tribunals may play a role in producing valuable information for states
involved in treaty disputes. States come into conflict when they take
actions that violate, or appear to violate, treaties. Tribunals can help resolve
such conflicts by discovering and revealing information about the meaning
of the agreement and the nature of the allegedly infringing action. Second,
when states come into conflict over conventions or customs governing the
division of global resources, tribunals can discover facts, help develop new
rules, or apply existing rules to new or unanticipated circumstances.48 We
will analyze each of these scenarios.
48. For a closely related argument, see Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in
Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229
(2004). In addition, Professor Andrew Guzman argues that states resist international dispute resolution
mechanisms because the reputational cost from losing can be a deadweight cost. He assumes that when
a state loses a case, its reputation is hurt. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining
Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 304 (2002). Our
focus is different from, but consistent with, that of these scholars: we are concerned with the question
of whether tribunals can be sufficiently neutral to serve these and similar functions. Both of the other
papers assume that neutral tribunals will function more successfully than biased tribunals. For an
argument that international adjudication (though the focus is on domestic adjudication of international
claims) may decrease international cooperation, see Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing
International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
authors).
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1. Information Disclosure in Treaty Disputes
States frequently enter treaties, and many states comply with their
treaty obligations despite the absence of a centralized enforcement mecha-
nism in the international legal system. However, states cannot prepare for
all future contingencies or anticipate all changed circumstances, nor will
they always have access to expert information needed to resolve disputes
about the meaning of a treaty or its application. In such situations, tribunals
can contribute to the resolution of treaty disputes by providing information
about the facts or the meaning of ambiguous treaty terms.
Consider a treaty that clarifies a border between states A and B. Prior
to ratification of the treaty, the two states advanced conflicting claims over
the same territory. The treaty resolves these claims by, say, stating that
henceforth the border follows a river. Each state might obey the treaty, but
neither will necessarily obey the treaty. Suppose that each state covets ter-
ritory on the other side of the river but also wants to hold onto the territory
on its own side of the river. Although A would be better off if it had some
of B's territory, A also knows that any effort to seize that territory will be
met with military force and perhaps a counterattack on A's territory.
Similarly, B knows that if it tries to grab some of A's territory, A will
retaliate.
This strategic problem has the structure of the familiar prisoner's
dilemma, and the solution is repeat play, i.e., the ongoing mutual threat of
retaliation. Each state "cooperates" by keeping to its own side of the bor-
der; each state "cheats" by sending forces across the border. Although a
state does best by cheating while the other state cooperates, it anticipates
that this would never happen: if one state cheats, the other state will
respond in kind. Thus, the fear of retaliation keeps both states on their own
side of the border, so long as the original balance of power that produced
the treaty remains roughly intact.49 The treaty formalizes cooperation
between states A and B and helps them escape the prisoner's dilemma.5"
So far we have explained how a treaty can be self-enforcing without
relying on an international tribunal. To understand the role of a tribunal,
one must complicate the story. It may be the case that the application of a
treaty to a conflict will be uncertain, either because the treaty is ambiguous
or because the facts are unclear. If each state has different beliefs about the
meaning of the treaty or about the facts, then the states will have different
interpretations of their obligations under the agreement. In such a case, an
49. Retaliation need not take the form of symmetrical action-i.e., an identical incursion across
the border. The victim of a border incursion can retaliate in many ways: seizing foreign assets located
within its territory, cutting off diplomatic communications, suspending trade agreements, and so forth.
50. For a discussion, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A
Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 113 (2003).
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impasse may occur. Tribunals can serve as a device to resolve the impasse
by providing a neutral judgment about the law and the facts.
To make the discussion more concrete, consider the Chamizal Tract
case, an arbitration that was established to resolve a border dispute between
the United States and Mexico." After the Mexican-American War of 1848,
the two countries agreed that their border would follow the Colorado and
Rio Grande rivers. 2 Rivers make good borders because they are easy to
observe, so it is clear when a border incursion occurs. The problem is that
the course of a river can change. The course can shift slowly, as the current
erodes one bank and deposits alluvium on the other side, and the course
can move quickly: after a flood the channel may be miles away from its old
location. This is called avulsion. Treaties between the United States and
Mexico stated that the border would shift with the river if the shift was due
to erosion. The border would remain in place if it shifted from avulsion. 3
In 1864, the Rio Grande flooded. When the floodwaters receded, the
course of the Rio Grande was different from what it had been at the end of
the Mexican-American War. Because of a lack of records, the location of
the river before the flood was unclear. It may have been at or near its origi-
nal location at the time of the treaty. Or it may have shifted gradually
through erosion to its location after the flood, or nearby. The Chamizal
Tract lay between these two positions. Both the United States and Mexico
claimed title to the whole tract and disagreed about the application of the
treaty, which was silent on how to handle such a contingency.
Suppose that each state had its own scientific experts, and that these
experts provided judgments about the pre-flood location of the river that
favored their own governments. In this situation, participation by a neutral
third party could be valuable. A tribunal could listen to the scientific and
legal experts on both sides and then provide its own judgment about the
meaning of the treaty and the facts since its ratification. If the tribunal acts
neutrally, then the information it produces will be better than either side's
independent information-the tribunal benefits from hearing from the
experts on both sides-and the increased information then makes clear
what costs or benefits would result from taking certain actions. In this case,
the loser's cooperative move is to comply with the judgment. If the tribu-
nal, for example, concludes that the present course of the river resulted
from avulsion, then the cooperative move is to treat the old location as the
51. In re International Title to the Chamizal Tract (U.S. v. Mex.) (Int'l Boundary Comm'n, June
15, 1911), reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1911).
52. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement Between the United States and the
Mexican Republic, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo];
Gadsden Treaty, Dec. 30, 1853, U.S.-Mex., 10 Stat. 1031.
53. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of Mexico Touching
the International Boundary Line Where It Follows the Bed of the Rio Grande and the Rio Colorado,
Nov. 12, 1884, U.S.-Mex., 24 Stat. 1011 [hereinafter Treaty of 1884].
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border. Otherwise, the cooperative move is to treat the new location as the
border.
One might ask why the states could not resolve the dispute without
the tribunal. Each state could make its own scientists available to the other,
and the scientists as a group could resolve their differences. There would
be no need for a third-party arbitrator or adjudicator. This can and does
happen. But there are problems of strategic behavior. One state might
withhold some information that would favor the other side. For example, it
could withhold land title records, scientific studies that reveal aspects of
the river's prior course, or records of the treaty negotiations that might
shed light upon an ambiguous provision. A tribunal can, if given the right
powers, overcome these problems by hiring its own scientists, conducting
its own research, demanding records from either side, and so forth.
The tribunal's function is to provide information. If the information is
good, the states will comply with the tribunal's judgment for the same
reason that they were willing to cooperate when there was no ambiguity: to
avoid retaliation. To be sure, the states might not comply with the tribu-
nal's judgment if it is biased or extreme or if a state's interests have
changed in the meantime.54 But if the states believe that the tribunal is
neutral, their interests remain constant, and the distribution of power
between the states has not shifted, then they have roughly the same incen-
tive to comply with the judgment of the tribunal as they did when they
made the original agreement to establish the tribunal.
It is important to understand what it means to say that the tribunal
serves the states' interests. We mean ex ante interests. Ex post-after the
dispute begins--only one state can win, and the tribunal cannot please both
states by declaring them both winners. But think of the tribunal as a
response to the problem of treaty interpretation. When the United States
and Mexico signed the treaties resolving their border dispute, they could
not incorporate provisions to cover every contingency. Indeed, states can
no more describe all contingencies in their treaties than private parties can
address all contingencies in their contracts. But just as a domestic court can
reduce the transaction costs of writing contracts by enforcing the hypo-
thetical optimal contract, an arbitrator can reduce the transaction costs of
writing treaties by enforcing the hypothetical optimal treaty. Such a judg-
ment will meet with compliance as long as the losing state's desire to
maintain a reputation for complying with treaties or to maintain a
54. In the Chamizal Tract arbitration itself, for example, the arbitral commission granted the
United States that portion of the territory that had occurred due to erosion but held that changes in the
tract caused by the 1864 flood should benefit Mexico. The United States refused to accept the award
because it claimed that the arbitrators had disobeyed their instructions. In re International Title to the
Chamizal Tract, supra note 51, at 783.
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cooperative relationship with the other state outweighs any loss it suffers
from an unfavorable judgment.
In sum, there are two conditions that make international adjudication
possible. First, the states have a surplus to divide-in our case, the disputed
piece of territory-and the present value of the payoffs from continued
cooperation exceeds the short-term gains from cheating. Second, the states
have imperfect information about whether an action is consistent with a
treaty, and the tribunal can help bring that information to light.
2. Information Disclosure in Customary International Law Disputes
States frequently come into conflict in ways that are not governed by
treaties, and in such circumstances, they invoke what is variously called
custom, convention, or customary international law. Customary interna-
tional law is typically defined as custom that states follow from a sense of
legal obligation.55 When states otherwise inclined to comply with custom-
ary international law come into conflict, they are sometimes willing to
resolve their conflict by appealing to customary international law.
International adjudication may help resolve disputes by clarifying the facts
and the pertinent customary international law.
We can give this theory more context by examining the customary
international law governing the acquisition of territorial sovereignty.56 In
prior centuries, Western nations considered much of the world
"unoccupied"--that is, not controlled by powerful states. States would ob-
tain sovereignty over these areas by "discovering" them and then announc-
ing their claim to the rest of the world. Although states frequently fought
over newly discovered territory, a convention arose through which states
would respect each other's prior claims as long as those claims conformed
to an always-shifting and frequently ambiguous set of rules. These rules
governed such issues as: how a claim would be made--did the discovering
state need to plant a flag, set up a police station, or just sail by the territory
in question? And how far could sovereignty extend-could the discovering
state claim an entire continent by planting a flag on a comer of it? 57
There are various theories about how such conventions could evolve,58
but the basic idea in the present context is that when there is plenty of land,
states do better-they come into less conflict while still obtaining
55. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (explaining how customary international law works).
56. This area of law was addressed recently in Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
57. See generally R. Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1963) (discussing factors in determining acquisition of territory; SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL
ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Developments in International Law, vol. 26,
1997).
58. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 55; JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2005) (ch. 2); Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 48, at
1321 (discussing how tribunals may help develop customary international law).
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territory-by respecting old claims and searching for unclaimed territory
than by contesting old claims while leaving unclaimed territory empty. The
strategic problem is one of coordination: once enough states adopt the
strategy of respecting old claims, no state can benefit from deviating from
this strategy, and the conventions are self-enforcing.
So far, we have not needed tribunals, but they can have a role in this
game. Suppose that two states disagree about two things: (1) the scope of
existing conventions and (2) the facts regarding the states' compliance
with the conventions. The first disagreement can arise because conventions
evolve in a decentralized way as states independently adjust their strategies
in response to developments in technology or changes in the environment,
and states have different sources of information about what conventions are
stable and value maximizing. The second disagreement can arise because
states have different sources of information about their past actions.
As an example, consider the Island of Palmas Case. 9 This dispute
involved claims by the United States and the Netherlands over an island
between the Philippines, an American colony at the time, and some Dutch
possessions. The United States claimed the island through a treaty with
Spain, which had discovered the island many centuries earlier. The
Netherlands claimed that it had exerted control over the island in the mean-
time and that Spain had not. The legal issue was whether the Spanish dis-
covery was enough to give Spain, and hence the United States, title to the
island or whether Spain had forfeited sovereignty to the Netherlands by
failing to exercise control over the island. The arbitrator held in favor of
the Netherlands on the ground that territorial sovereignty must be
maintained through a display of authority.
The arbitrator did two things. He decided whether the law required
continuous control, and he decided whether Spain had exerted continuous
control. His first decision may have been based on the assumption that, in
the absence of continuous control, conflict between states over territory
would be more common. His second decision was based on an assessment
of the facts. Thus, on both questions the arbitrator was revealing informa-
tion that one or both states lacked. On the former question, the arbitrator
brought to bear expert knowledge on the likely effects of different rules
concerning the acquisition of territorial sovereignty, and he chose the one
that reduced the systemwide costs that would have resulted from more
conflict.6" On the latter question, he was able to reveal information by
evaluating the factual claims made by both sides of the dispute.
As with treaty disputes, one might again ask why the states needed the
tribunal. Why not consult their own historians and legal experts and come
59. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); see also Ginsburg &
McAdams, supra note 48, at 1297-300.
60. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 48, at 1298-301.
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to the same conclusion? The answer is that each state has only partial
information, and each also has strategic incentives to withhold information
that might benefit the other state. The tribunal can collect information and
provide a neutral judgment. As in the case of treaties, the judgment is, in
effect, a disclosure of information, and if the tribunal is competent and
neutral and the states' payoffs have not changed sufficiently since the
establishment of the tribunal, the states have an incentive to comply with
the judgment.
3. The Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Our two arguments are versions of one idea. When states interact with
each other repeatedly over time, they can cooperate. Their cooperation can
result from explicit agreements (treaties) or the unilateral adoption of
strategies that permit reciprocal, value-generating behavior (conventions or
customary international law). Tribunals have a similar role in the two
models. In the model of treaties, tribunals are used to discover and reveal
information about the meaning of the treaty and each state's compliance
with its treaty obligations. In the model of convention, tribunals are used to
interpret customary international law and determine each state's compli-
ance with it.61 Tribunals can be effective only if the state that loses is (usu-
ally) willing to comply with the judgment. If the loser is the defendant,
then it pays reparations or takes any other action required by the tribunal. If
the loser is the complainant, then it drops its claim against the defendant
and does not pursue it any further through other forums, diplomatic
channels, or the threat of force.
Why would the loser comply with the judgment? The cost of compli-
ance-paying reparations, yielding territory, and so forth-may be signifi-
cant. But there is a benefit from compliance as well. A state that complies
retains the option to rely on tribunals in the future, for a state that routinely
violated judgments would not credibly be able to propose international
adjudication as a way of resolving a dispute with another state. Thus, a
state will comply with the judgment if the cost of compliance is less than
the future benefits of continued use of adjudication. The future benefits of
adjudication can be high only if the tribunal performs well by resolving the
dispute neutrally as between the disputing states. In other words, the tribu-
nal must interpret the treaty or convention in a way that maximizes its (ex
ante) value to the two parties.62 There may be a range of possible outcomes
that the states would jointly accept as an alternative to impasse or war;
61. See generally id. Ginsburg and McAdams also argue that an international tribunal may solve
a coordination problem even when information is complete. Id. at 1262-7 1.
62. A state that wants to breach an agreement may reward members of a tribunal that finds in its
favor; thus, tribunals may be tempted to find in favor of whichever state is wealthier or more powerful.
But panel members who obtain a reputation for holding in favor of the more powerful state will not be
used again because in future disputes the weaker state will refuse to consent to them.
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jargon refers to this range as the "win set" between the two states' reserva-
tion prices. States, therefore, will use international adjudication only if the
tribunal, over time, provides an accurate (or politically sensitive) judgment
within the win set. If the tribunal violates its instructions and allows the
personal preferences, ideological commitments, or national loyalties of its
members to influence the judgment too much, then compliance might not
occur. States will use tribunals and comply with their judgments only if
they believe that the judgments will be unbiased.63
Under what conditions will the tribunal render an unbiased decision?
Let us suppose that the tribunal consists of a single individual. We might
fear that each state will offer to bribe the tribunal to provide a judgment in
its favor. The bribe could be cash or something subtler. For instance, either
state might promise to support the adjudicator's reappointment to the tri-
bunal or appointment to some other international body after the case is
over. Or, even if the states do not make the promise explicitly, they might
make a practice of providing benefits to judges or arbitrators who have
ruled in their favor in the past. Thus, judges and arbitrators know that if
they rule for a certain state, they can expect lucrative positions or other
forms of career advancement. Finally, when a judge or arbitrator is a
national of one state, or the national of a friend of one state, the implicit
bribe might take the form of a domestic political position or other benefit.
In sum, we might suppose that the tribunal--or the various members-will
sell the judgment to the higher bidder.
If tribunals regularly did this, however, states would never use them.
The state that expects to lose the "auction" for the judges' votes will refuse
to consent to the tribunal in the first place. To obtain business, tribunals
must establish a reputation for neutrality. They can do this initially by
drawing their members from the pool of individuals who occupy relevant
positions of trust-domestic judges, for example-and then by turning
down bribes and rendering neutral judgments. In short, arbitrators or judges
have an incentive to rule within the range of outcomes acceptable to the
states-in other words, acting according to their instructions or according
to the ex ante boundaries of cooperation-because such decisions make it
more likely that they will be used again. The tribunal's incentives to render
an unbiased judgment are reputational. If it renders a biased judgment, then
the losing state might not comply. Although other states might infer that
the loser is at fault and not that the tribunal made a poor judgment, if
enough noncompliance occurs, then other states will eventually conclude
that the tribunal is biased or defective and refuse to use it themselves.
To summarize, third-party dispute resolution is possible when all
three of the following conditions prevail:
63. See Guzman, supra note 48, at 326.
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1. Two (or more) states gain enough from future cooperation that
they are able to refrain from cheating in the present.
2. A dispute arises as a result of asymmetric information: each state
has private information about its own past actions or different
beliefs about the meaning of a treaty or convention.
3. The tribunal has the right kind of expertise or information, or the
ability to generate information, and it is sufficiently neutral,
because (a) it has sufficient business, (b) its members care about
future payoffs, and (c) its members do not have strong ideological
or national preferences.
Thus far, we have assumed that a third-party dispute resolution mechanism
can be designed in such a way to ensure that it is informed and unbiased. In
the next section we will explain this assumption and the conditions under
which it holds.
C. The Design of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
States do not need a tribunal if the law and the facts are clear. When a
treaty or convention clearly governs the dispute and states have the same
information about the relevant facts, there is nothing a tribunal can contrib-
ute to the resolution of the dispute. But when the law or facts are unclear,
and when the requirements for international adjudication are satisfied,
states may be able to avoid conflict by relying on tribunals. In this section,
we discuss different dispute resolution structures and how they relate to the
purposes served by international adjudication discussed above.
1. The Single Arbitrator
The simplest tribunal consists of a single person. 6' The two states can-
not resolve the dispute, but they can agree on appointing a person to do so.
This might seem like a paradox. States that cannot agree on whether a
treaty was violated would seem unlikely to agree on the appointment of a
person to decide the same question. However, the paradox is only super-
ficial. The states may have better information about the proposed arbitrator
than they do about the law or facts of the dispute. Indeed, to agree on an
arbitrator, the states need to know only that the individual is neutral and
has the relevant expertise. To settle the dispute without seeking the inter-
vention of a third party, states need to have the same information about the
underlying facts and agree on the interpretation of a treaty or convention.
Frequently, the arbitrator is the head, or some other important official,
of a state that has friendly relations with the disputing states. For example,
Czar Alexander of Russia arbitrated a claim arising from a disputed provi-
sion in the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812 between Britain
64. Cf SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 1-5 (discussing the logic of the triad for adjudication).
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and the United States.65 Because the arbitrator knows that he will have to
deal with both states in the future, he does not want to risk alienating either
of them, as this may create suspicion or provoke retaliation. Thus, the
arbitrator has an incentive to render a neutral judgment.
A neutral and expert arbitrator is always an appealing means for
resolving a dispute. But such an arbitrator cannot always be identified, and
there is always the risk that the chosen arbitrator may turn out to be biased
or incompetent. In deciding whether to go to arbitration, each state weighs
the benefits (avoidance of conflict) against the risks (a biased outcome). On
the cost side, a biased outcome will injure one state, and it may not be will-
ing to comply with the judgment. The same is true when the arbitrator sim-
ply errs. Ex ante, the parties will avoid arbitration and rely on diplomacy
backed by the threat of war if they cannot find, and agree on, an arbitrator
who is sufficiently likely to be neutral and expert.
2. Three (or More) Arbitrators
With the single-arbitrator configuration as background, we can under-
stand the three-arbitrator model. Under this system, each state appoints one
arbitrator, and then the two state arbitrators jointly appoint a third arbitra-
tor. The states expect their appointees to represent their interests and the
third arbitrator to be neutral. The most plausible explanation for this
approach is that the "states"--that is, the foreign minister or other official
that addresses international conflicts--do not know much about the nature
of the dispute and the qualifications of potential neutral arbitrators. To
solve this problem, states delegate to an appointee the power to agree on a
neutral tiebreaker. The appointee is an agent; his task is to ensure that the
third arbitrator is not biased in favor of the other side. If both appointees
have this task, and they perform their tasks well, then the third arbitrator
will be neutral as between the states.
The problem is that whenever a principal relies on an agent, it incurs
the risk that the agent will perform inadequately or self-interestedly. If the
state's own ministers do not choose the single neutral arbitrator but instead
rely on their appointee to do so, they take the chance that the appointee will
agree to the selection of a biased arbitrator. An appointee might be outwit-
ted by the arbitrator on the other side, or he might take insufficient care in
choosing the third arbitrator, or he might receive a private benefit by agree-
ing to a biased selection. This is the problem of agency slack. Because of
this risk, a three-arbitrator tribunal is more likely to render a judgment that
is biased than a single-arbitrator tribunal. If the bias is high enough, it
could result in judgments that are outside the range of outcomes that are
acceptable to both parties and therefore incapable of procuring compliance.
65. A.M. STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, 1794-1970, 26 (3d ed. 1990).
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For that reason, single-arbitrator tribunals should enjoy a higher level of
compliance than three-arbitrator tribunals, holding constant the level of
expertise and information. But this is not to say that three-arbitrator tribu-
nals are useless. States will use them when they cannot identify a neutral
and informed arbitrator, and they prefer the three-party system to the
alternative--diplomacy, impasse, and possible conflict or war.
3. From Arbitration to Courts
One problem with arbitration is that the decision makers are picked
anew each time. Although states will find themselves choosing from a rela-
tively small pool of experienced experts, it is difficult (though not impossi-
ble) for a jurisprudence to develop. States maintain control over the
arbitration by stipulating the question for the arbitrator to answer; but they
lose the benefit of being able to rely on a coherent set of rules emerging
from the repeated examination of similar issues by a discrete, relatively
permanent group of people-a proper judiciary. This forces states to incur
the additional cost of establishing new rules for each dispute and creates
unpredictability.
Some international tribunals reflect an effort to solve this problem
without adopting all of the features of true courts. The Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA), for example, was, in essence, a pool of arbitrators-in-
waiting. In theory, the PCA, by providing a ready pool of arbitrators, made
arbitration more attractive. But while the pool reduces the transaction costs
of finding a generally able and reputable arbitrator, the states do not neces-
sarily have a guarantee that any particular arbitrator will be able or willing
to maximize the ex ante value of the agreement between them. The transac-
tion costs of finding an arbitrator are a relatively small deterrent compared
with the risk of selecting a biased or incompetent one. And because each
dispute involves a unique combination of interests, facts, and treaty provi-
sions, expertise cannot be generalized. Confidence can come only as the
parties repeatedly and successfully use a particular arbitrator or the pool.
But why should the states repeatedly take this risk rather than rely on their
own information to select an arbitrator? This reluctance to "enter the pool"
prevents resources such as the PCA from being successful. A coherent
jurisprudence can only arise when states are required to use the same body
for dispute resolution.
But how can states be compelled to bring their disputes to a particular
tribunal? What prevents a state from simply refusing to appear before the
tribunal in response to a suit by another state? The legal answer is compul-
sory jurisdiction: once a state submits to the jurisdiction of a tribunal, it
cannot withdraw without violating international law except by giving
substantial notice. But then the question is why states would submit to
compulsory jurisdiction.
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Rational states will not submit to compulsory jurisdiction unless they
believe that they will benefit from it. The benefit is the right to force other
states to appear before a tribunal.66 The cost is that a state might be forced
to appear as a defendant against its wishes. One necessary condition for the
benefits to exceed the costs is that the international law over which the
court has jurisdiction produces a net benefit for all states that are involved.
This is certainly possible, especially for treaties that states voluntarily
enter. The other condition, which is far more difficult to ensure, is the
neutrality of the tribunal. If jurisdiction is compulsory, then states cannot
withhold consent to a tribunal whose members they do not trust. If the tri-
bunal is to have jurisdiction over the disputes of many different states, then
it will have to consist of judges from diverse states and not just those
whom two states involved in a dispute consent to, as in the case of
arbitration.
The inability of disputing states to veto tribunals or panels that they
do not trust is the first characteristic of the independent tribunal. This char-
acteristic raises the following question: if judges no longer need to please
particular states to obtain repeat business, why should they ensure that their
judgment falls within the win set of the two disputing states? The judges
might indulge personal biases or try to develop the law in ways that benefit
all states, including those that are not parties to the dispute. If judges
routinely fail to satisfy the parties' ex ante interests, then states may with-
draw their consent to the tribunal's jurisdiction or refuse to comply with its
judgments.
Reflecting this concern, tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction are
often staffed with nationals from the states subject to their jurisdiction, and,
usually, a state party will have the right to insist that one of the judges on a
panel be a national.67 But this is not the same as the three-arbitrator panel,
where the national's consent to a neutral third arbitrator was necessary for
the arbitration to go forward. In courts, the national can always be outvoted
by judges who have no connection to his or her state.
In sum, states may achieve practical advantages by establishing rela-
tively independent tribunals. These tribunals, unlike classic arbitration
panels, can develop an institutional memory, are available at the time of a
dispute, and need not be created anew. These advantages could outweigh
the costs of independence-including the inability to ensure that a tribunal
makes a decision satisfactory to both parties-but they might not: this is an
empirical question.
66. States always require reciprocity-they will not allow themselves to be sued by states that do
not allow themselves to be sued for the same types of harm. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, para. 3, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (authorizing this practice).
67. See, e.g., id. at art. 31, para. 3.
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There is another important reason why states might create independ-
ent tribunals. Ordinary citizens and elected officials have, from time to
time, sought to replace war with adjudication.68 This powerful ideal can
have great attraction, especially after times of conflict when politicians
either believe that the ideal can be achieved or are rewarded by constituents
who have the same hope. Many international courts have been created in
the aftermath of great conflicts, including the PCIJ after World War I and
the ICJ after World War II. The flurry of tribunal making in the 1990s fol-
lowed the end of the Cold War. All of these tribunals were created in a
heady atmosphere of fear that the earlier conflict would recur mixed with
hope that conflict could be replaced with adjudication. The question is
whether tribunals created in such an atmosphere can endure the assaults of
normal international politics once the temporary unity among the victors
fades.
4. Measuring Tribunal Independence
A tribunal can be more or less independent of the two states that hap-
pen to appear before it at a given time.69 At one extreme, the single arbitra-
tor is heavily dependent: he is jointly chosen by the two states, and if one
or both of the states are unhappy with his judgment, they may never use
him again-or they may even retaliate against him in other ways. At the
other extreme is the permanent judicial body: its members are appointed in
advance, and the tribunal has compulsory jurisdiction. States cannot easily
evade its reach, it can develop and apply a more predictable body of law,
and it can quickly render a judgment.
Table 1: Tribunal Independence
characteristic dependent independent
term duration of the dispute permanent
jurisdiction dispute/treaty area of law
initiation victim independent party
number of bilateral multilateral/intervention right
states
state consent to after dispute occurs before dispute occurs
jurisdiction I
source of panel chosen by states in dispute chosen by nonparty states,
members I other third party
68. See SHABTAi ROSENNE, WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 1-8 (Terry D. Gill ed., 6th ed.
2003).
69. Keohane and his coauthors also focus on independence. For their discussion, which has
influenced ours, see Keohane et al., supra note 17, at 75-78. They also look at access and legal
embeddedness, factors from which we abstract. See id. at 78-82 (access), 82-84 (legal embeddedness).
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Table 1 contains the factors we have mentioned and adds a few more.
Starting with the first row, a dependent tribunal lasts only as long as the
dispute; an independent tribunal is permanent.7" A dependent tribunal has
only the jurisdiction that the disputing parties give it; an independent tribu-
nal has fixed jurisdiction over an area of law, such as trade. A dependent
tribunal can be invoked only by the consent of the states after a dispute; an
independent tribunal can be invoked by a third party, such as a prosecutor
(like the ICC). A dependent tribunal resolves a dispute only between two
states or sometimes a few states; an independent tribunal is available to all
states that are parties to the treaty that created it, and an affected state that
is not a part of the initial dispute may have a right to intervene. A depend-
ent tribunal comes into existence after the dispute arises, and only with the
consent of the disputing states; an independent tribunal exists before the
dispute, beginning when the states enter into a treaty or consent to its juris-
diction. States cannot withdraw from the jurisdiction of an independent
tribunal without losing the ability to invoke it. Finally, disputing states
choose the judges for a dependent tribunal. State parties to a treaty also
appoint the judges for an independent tribunal, but they have no control
over the judges who hear their case when a dispute arises. Note that inde-
pendence is a continuous variable, and the design of different tribunals
reflects a range of values.
In sum, independence is a measure of a tribunal member's
vulnerability to the state that appoints him. Tribunals composed of depend-
ent members have a strong incentive to serve the joint interests of the dis-
puting states. Tribunals composed of independent members have a weaker
incentive to serve those states' interests and are more likely to allow moral
ideals, ideological imperatives, or the interests of other states to influence
their judgments.
D. Measurements of Effectiveness
We can now draw together the threads of our argument. The conven-
tional wisdom holds that a tribunal's effectiveness and independence are
positively correlated.71 This assumption derives from the success of inde-
pendent courts in a domestic setting. What it ignores is the radical differ-
ence in the institutional environments in which domestic and international
courts operate. The latter have no direct enforcement mechanism, and,
because international law is relatively difficult to change, are less con-
strained by the threat of legislative overrides. These observations bring into
focus the limits of international tribunals. They can help states solve coop-
eration problems by providing information and delivering unbiased
70. Although its members are replaced after fixed terms, these terms do not coincide with any
particular dispute.
71. See supra Introduction.
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opinions. But they cannot issue judgments that run contrary to the interests
of the parties to a dispute. If they do so, their rulings will be ignored and
states will use them less often. And therein lies the problem. More inde-
pendent tribunals are less likely to issue decisions that are satisfactory to
all state parties to a dispute. So making a tribunal independent may actually
undermine its effectiveness. For these reasons, we argue that effectiveness
and independence are, at best, uncorrelated and may be negatively
correlated.
To make this argument on empirical grounds, we need to measure
"effectiveness." While this is difficult, we have identified three possible
measures.
First, one could look at compliance. A tribunal is effective if states
comply with its judgments. Compliance can be measured in terms of a
compliance rate: the number of complied-with judgments divided by the
total number of judgments.
One problem with this measure is that compliance can be hard to
observe. Sometimes states comply with a judgment after years or even dec-
ades; in the meantime, conditions have changed. Should this kind of behav-
ior count as compliance? More serious, compliance rates are subject to
selection effects. States might submit politically sensitive cases to more
effective tribunals and easier, less sensitive cases to less effective tribunals.
If this occurs, then effective tribunals might have compliance rates that are
no better than those of weak tribunals, not because of the design of the
tribunal but because of the nature of the dispute.
Second, one could measure effectiveness through usage. If a tribunal
is -ineffective, states will stop using it. Usage can be measured in either
gross or refined terms. One might look at the number of states that use a
tribunal, the number of cases, the number of cases per year, the number of
cases per state per year, and so on, depending on the importance of a
precise measurement.72
A problem with this measure is that usage can reflect factors other
than effectiveness, such as the importance of the area of international law
that the tribunal governs. If trade disputes are more important and numer-
ous than maritime disputes, then a less effective trade court might be used
more often than an effective maritime court. Additionally, usage rates, like
compliance rates, are subject to selection effects. States might settle their
disputes in the shadow of an effective court because they can anticipate its
judgment and compliance by the loser. If ineffective courts are
unpredictable, they might be used more often.
72. Cf id. at 91 (measuring the average annual caseloads of six international tribunals since
founding). Keohane's usage statistics are misleading because they do not control for membership and
other factors.
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Third, one could look at the overall success of the treaty regime that
established the court. Consider trade again. The international trade system
is supposed to enhance trade flows. Imagine that the adjudication system is
converted from a dependent tribunal to an independent tribunal. Whether
or not the new tribunal is used or complied with more often, a jump in
trade flows after this change would be a good indication of an effective
court, all else being equal. The problem is that everything else is never
equal, and often the indicator of success is obscure. Did international coop-
eration increase after the ICJ was established? This kind of question is
impossible to answer.
We will use all three measures of effectiveness in the next Part, but it
is important to keep in mind that they are all highly imperfect. One could
make the case that selection effects undermine any effort to find a causal
relationship between independence and effectiveness, at least for usage and
compliance. If so, we can do no better than establish our weak thesis-that
there is no evidence that independent tribunals are more effective than
dependent tribunals.7 3
III
THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
In this Part, we examine various international tribunals for evidence
that sheds light on the relationship between independence and
effectiveness. There are currently a dozen or more international tribunals in
existence. Some of these tribunals are regarded as successes, others as fail-
ures. Some of these tribunals are dependent in our technical sense, others
independent. Thus, we have the variation we need to test the hypothesis
that independent tribunals outperform dependent tribunals.
We begin our evaluation of the evidence with a discussion of the ad
hoc arbitration system that prospered during the nineteenth century. This
system is not itself a "tribunal," and therefore comparing it to the later
twentieth-century tribunals is problematic. But arbitration is the purest
example of dependence, so it provides a useful baseline against which to
evaluate the other tribunals. We continue with a look at some well-known,
relatively independent tribunals: the ICJ, the IACHR, and GATT and the
WTO's dispute resolution mechanism.
A. Arbitration
Arbitration is as old as diplomacy. The ancient Greeks practiced it, as
did feudal lords during the Middle Ages and leaders of the emerging
73. As we discuss below, however, there are some efforts to deal with selection problems in
studies of GATT and the WTO.
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European states in: the early modem period.7 4 Modem arbitration is
conventionally dated to the Jay Treaty, which provided that outstanding
claims arising from the revolutionary war would be submitted to
arbitration.75 Arbitration became more common after the Napoleonic Wars
and was flourishing by the second half of the nineteenth century.76 It has
continued to the present day, even as more formal tribunals have sprung up
and attracted disputes that once may have been submitted to arbitration.
Arbitration comes in many forms, but in essence it involves the
appointment of one or more individuals to decide a usually narrow legal or
factual issue. The arbitrators may invent their own rules of procedure and
evidence, and they frequently draw on conventional or codified rules. All
of these characteristics are those of a highly dependent tribunal: the tribu-
nal is appointed ex post, only the disputing states can appear before it, and
the tribunal lasts only as long as necessary to resolve the dispute.
1. Ad Hoc International Arbitration
In order to get a feel for the popularity and effectiveness of arbitra-
tion, we collected data on arbitrations from 1794 to 1989. Our source is a
book by Professor A.M. Stuyt, which contains information on every arbi-
tration during that period.77 We consider only those arbitrations for which
Stuyt provides the identities of both parties and the starting date. For many
but not all of the arbitrations he provides other important information, in-
cluding the year of the judgment, whether the arbitration was performed by
a commission or by a head of state or other official, the nature of the
dispute, the identity of the winner, the judgment, and whether compliance
occurred.
There were 467 arbitrations during the period, though many were
closely related or stemmed from a single dispute. Table 2 provides the
number of arbitrations by twenty-year periods (excluding the last ten years
of the data set and arbitrations for which no starting year was given). The
absolute number of arbitrations increased until just before World War I and
diminished thereafter. If we confine ourselves to arbitrations involving two
Great Powers or one Great Power and the United States,78 the pattern of
arbitrations was the same. Thus, the increase was not driven solely by
74. JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 153-89
(1929).
75. Id. at vii; see also Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 25.
76. RALSTON, supra note 74, at vii; see also Mark W. Janis, The International Court, in
INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13-14 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992); J.
GILLIS WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 9 (1979).
77. STUYT, supra note 65.
78. The Great Powers include Britain, Russia, France, Prussia (Germany after 1870), Italy after
1870, and Japan after 1904. Conventionally, the United States is excluded before 1898, but since the
United States was a major maritime power throughout the nineteenth century, it seems appropriate to
include it. See NORMAN RICH, GREAT POWER DIPLOMACY, 1814-1914, at 213-23 (1992).
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growth in the number of independent states during the nineteenth century.
The failure of the arbitration rate to recover even after the end of World
War II may have been due to the rise of other dispute resolution
mechanisms.
Table 2: Arbitrations by Twenty-Year Periods79
Years All States Involving Two Great
Powers or U.S.
1794-1819 23 *
1820-1839 9 2
1840-1859 29 3
1860-1879 48 6
1880-1899 116 17
1900-1919** 101 16
1920-1939 80 5
1940-1959 18 0
1960-1979 16 4
*No Great Power data.
*Note: 1900-1914, there were eighty-six arbitrations; 1915-1919, there were
fifteen.
Most arbitrations involved two states. The most common topics were,
in order: borders (90), personal claims (68), maritime seizures (36), arbi-
trary acts (29), treaty interpretation (26), war damages (15), indemnity
(12), mutual claims (12), civil insurrection (11), and military action (8).
These are Stuyt's classifications and are not transparent, but they give a
sense of the landscape. Of the arbitrations for which this information was
given, 306 (about two-thirds) involved a commission of three people or
more, and 145 involved a single arbitrator or mediator, typically a head of
state. Commissions were popular for civil insurrections, war damages, and
personal claims. Heads of state were popular for arbitrary acts and
maritime seizures."0
It is well known that Britain and the United States were early
champions of arbitration, and the numbers bear out the conventional wis-
dom. But there are also some surprises. Table 3 lists the main users of
arbitration.
79. Compiled from STUYT, supra note 65.
80. See id.
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Table 3: Arbitration by State8'
UK 116
USA 106
France 81
Germany 50
Chile 33
Italy 32
Peru 29
Venezuela 24
Mexico 20
Spain 20
Colombia 19
Portugal 18
Brazil 16
Netherlands 15
Ecuador 13
Austria 11
Argentina 11
Russia 9
Bolivia 8
Canada 8
China 5
Japan 4
The rough pattern that emerges is that large countries-not necessar-
ily Great Powers-use arbitration frequently and Latin American countries
have a special preference for arbitration. These observations can tentatively
be explained. Large countries should use arbitration more often than small
countries because they have more foreign interactions, which creates an
increased risk of disputes with other nations. The Latin American countries
are older than similar, smaller countries in Africa and Asia; they came into
existence prior to the heyday of arbitration in the early- to mid-nineteenth
century. The historical evidence suggests that the United States encouraged
them to rely on arbitration. 82 There is little evidence that democracy affects
the choice to arbitrate. Many of the prominent users of arbitration-
Germany, Chile, Italy-were not democracies during the relevant
periods.83
81. Compiled from id.
82. RALSTON, supra note 74, at 142-46.
83. Raymond claims that democracies choose arbitration more often than mediation because
arbitration is more legalistic, and democracies care more for the rule of law. See Gregory A. Raymond,
Democracies, Disputes and Third-Party Intermediaries, 38 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 24, 34, 37-38 (1994).
His regression, which uses the Stuyt database, does show that pairs of democracies are more likely to
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In the abstract, we cannot say that the usage of arbitration is high or
low. But it is telling that the frequency of arbitration increased steadily
throughout the nineteenth century, suggesting that states were pleased with
the results. Usage can be measured in various ways, as we discuss below.
For now, it is useful for baseline purposes to observe that arbitrated dis-
putes peaked just prior to World War I at six per year. A more precise
measure-arbitrated disputes per state per year-is 0.06 for the period
1860 to 1879, 0.15 for the period 1880 to 1899, and 0.14 for the period
1900 to 1919.84 The significance of these figures will become clearer when
we compare tribunals in Part III.E.
Stuyt provides data on compliance-our second measure of effective-
ness-for 220 disputes, but the figures are difficult to interpret. Of the 220
cases, he says that compliance occurred 206 times, for a very high (94%)
compliance rate.85 However, Stuyt does not explain how he defined and
measured compliance. Further, it is possible that the cases with compliance
information are a biased sample. If it is harder to collect information about
noncompliance than information about compliance, then it could be that all
or most of the 247 cases for which there is no information should be treated
as noncompliance cases. If the no-information cases represent
noncompliance, then the compliance rate is 44%.
2. A Recent Example: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was created in the aftermath of the
Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the takeover of the American embassy in
Tehran by student militants.86 The United States responded by freezing
Iran's assets.87 After negotiations through an intermediary, Iran agreed to
release the American hostages, the United States agreed to unfreeze Iran's
assets, and both states agreed to resolve outstanding commercial and
interstate disputes through arbitration. 8  As part of the agreement, the
United States transferred a portion of Iran's assets to an account in a
use arbitration (that is, "commissions") than mediation (that is, "heads of state"), but not that
democracies are more likely to use either of these procedures than an alternative like diplomacy or war.
See id. at 34 tbl.2. In addition, he interprets the head-of-state cases as not involving legal judgments.
See id. at 28 (noting that "[i]nternational mediation differs from arbitration in that it is a political rather
than judicial form of conflict resolution"). This appears to be wrong. The one-party cases seem to be
formal arbitrations.
84. We used the numbers for arbitrations from Table 2. During all three periods, there were on
average thirty-eight independent states. Data for the number of states per year are from the Correlates
of War Project, Data Sets, at http://www.umich.edu/-cowproj/dataset.html#States (last visited Aug. 27,
2004). The website contains the definition of states.
85. See STUYT, supra note 65.
86. See Caron, supra note 27, at 104 n.l.
87. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 17 (May
24).
88. For a discussion of the Algiers Accords, which ended the Iranian Hostage Crisis and
established the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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foreign bank and instructed the bank to release those assets as necessary to
satisfy judgments issued by the Tribunal.89 The Tribunal began operation in
1981.90
The Tribunal has considerable resources, has decided many cases over
the course of more than two decades, and has generally experienced full
compliance with its decisions.9' For these reasons, one might think of the
Tribunal as an authentic international court on par with the ICJ. In fact,
however, the Tribunal exemplifies classic ad hoc arbitration. The Tribunal
is not permanent; it did not exist before the Iranian Revolution and the hos-
tage crisis; it will last only as long as is necessary to resolve the claims that
have been assigned to it. Third-party states have no right to intervene in the
proceedings. The composition of the Tribunal followed the traditional pat-
tern of an ad hoc dispute resolution system. Each state appointed three
judges, and those judges jointly appointed three "neutrals." So there were a
total of nine judges: three Americans, three Iranians, and three nationals
from other states. The Tribunal, like the classic ad hoc arbitration system,
is highly dependent.
It is widely agreed that the Tribunal has been a success, and several
objective measures confirm this view. The agreement provided that parties
had to file their claims by January 1982. Approximately 3900 claims were
filed, and nearly all have been resolved.92 United States claimants have
been awarded more than $2 billion, and Iranian claimants have been
awarded about $1 billion.93 The independence of the tribunal is low, and
compliance has been high.
B. International Court of Justice
A striking contrast to the success of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal can
be found at the other end of the adjudicatory spectrum-the International
Court of Justice. The ICJ was created by the 1946 Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which is part of the Charter of the United
Nations.94 The ICJ describes itself as the "principal judicial organ of the
United Nations,"95 and its primary function is to settle legal disputes under
international law that are submitted to it by states.96 It also may issue
89. See Caron, supra note 27, at 129.
90. For background information, see Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, at www.iusct.org/
background-english.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
91. See generally THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION: A STUDY BY THE PANEL ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (David D. Caron & John R. Crook eds., 2000).
92. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Communiqu6, Doc. No. 04/1 (Jan. 20, 2004), at
www.iusct.org/communique-english.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
93. Id.
94. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 66.
95. Id. at art. 1.
96. Id.
[Vol. 93:1
HeinOnline  -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 34 2005
INTERNA TIONAL TRIBUNALS
advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by a selected group of
international organizations. The Statute of the ICJ was based on the
organizing statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which
the ICJ replaced.97 The ICJ is a permanent international organization whose
existence is not dependent on the resolution of any particular dispute.98
The ICJ is considered the model of a permanent international court. It
has a substantial administrative bureaucracy, a broad jurisdiction, and is
considered by many to have the final word on questions of international
law.99 The U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council select the
fifteen judges who compose the Court,' °° and the judges serve terms of
nine years.'0 ' No two judges are permitted from the same nation.0 2
One-third of the seats come open every three years,' 3 with the possibility
of reappointment of judges whose terms have expired."°4 If a state party in
a case does not have a judge of its nationality on the Court, it may appoint
an ad hoc judge of its choice for that case.'0 5 According to the ICJ, the
General Assembly and the Security Council have sought to represent
different regions and legal traditions on the Court,'0 6 but other sources
make clear that powerful countries control individual seats; the United
States, for example, has always had a judge of its nationality on the
Court. 1
0 7
The Statute of the ICJ gives the Court three types of jurisdiction.' 8
First, states may submit a dispute by special, that is, ad hoc agreement:
97. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
98. For background information, see International Court of Justice, 1946-1996, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
99. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the
International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791;
U.N. Charter arts. 92-96; Report of the ICJ, 1 Aug. 2002-31 July 2003 to the U.N. General Assembly,
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/igeninf AnnualReports/iicj.annual report_
2002-2003.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
100. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 66, art. 4, para. 1. (regarding U.N.
appointment of judges); id. at art. 3, para. 1 (regarding the number of judges).
101. Id. at art. 13, para. 1.
102. Id. at art. 3, para. 1.
103. See id. at art. 13, para. 1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at art. 31, para. 3.
106. Id. at art. 9; see generally Stephen M. Schwebel, National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of the
International Court of Justice, 48 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 889 (1999).
107. Since the ICJ's founding, the tradition has been for each of the five permanent member states
of the United Nations Security Council to have a seat on the Court. The text of the Statute says nothing
in this regard but that is the reality of power politics. The other ten members of the ICJ are then chosen,
again not based on any wording in the Statute but on a long-standing, negotiated compromise that
governs the mix of the UN Security Council as well, with three members from African states, two from
Latin American states, two from Asian states, and three from European states (traditionally two from
the West and one from the East of Europe). Davis R. Robinson, The Role of Politics in the Election and
the Work of Judges of the International Court of Justice, 97 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 277, 278
(2003).
108. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 66, arts. 36-37, 65.
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both states must agree to such a submission. Second, a treaty may contain a
jurisdictional clause that submits disputes to the ICJ for resolution. Many
bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties between the United
States and other nations of the world contain such a clause, as do some
multilateral treaties such as the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations."°9 Third, states may declare consent to the "compulsory" juris-
diction of the Court. Consenting states agree to submit to the ICJ all inter-
national legal disputes with other states that also have accepted compulsory
jurisdiction under similar conditions. Today, sixty-four nations have agreed
to such jurisdiction." 0
Although the ICJ has some of the characteristics of an independent
court-it is a permanent institution with a continuous body of judges-its
level of independence turns on the type of jurisdiction. To the extent states
use the Court's ad hoc jurisdiction, the ICJ is dependent. If states do not
like the way that the ICJ resolves ad hoc disputes, they can refrain from
submitting future disputes to it, and the ICJ will lose business. To maintain
its relevance and power, the ICJ must resolve these disputes in a manner
consistent with the interests of the disputing parties. To the extent that
states submit to compulsory (ex ante) jurisdiction, the ICJ is relatively
independent. Although states can withdraw if they do not like ICJ judg-
ments, withdrawal incurs political costs and delay; meanwhile, withdraw-
ing states cannot stop other states from bringing them to court. To the
extent that treaties provide the basis for jurisdiction, the ICJ's independ-
ence is moderate. Old treaties cannot easily be revised, but if states do not
like the ICJ's decisions, they can refrain from giving it jurisdiction in
subsequent treaties.
To determine the effectiveness of the ICJ, let us examine some usage
and compliance statistics. Table 4 contains the compliance rates and num-
ber of disputes for each type of jurisdiction.
109. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/consul.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2004).
110. International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of
the Court, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm (last
visited Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Declarations of Recognition].
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Table 4: ICJ Compliance and Usage' I
Compliance Rate Disputes Disputes/Year
Special agreement 85.7% 15 .27
Treaty 60% 47 .84
Compulsory 40% 30 .54
Total or average 61.9% (average) 92 (total) 1.65 (total)
Note: This table excludes the ICJ's advisory jurisdiction; it shows only disputes
that have resulted in a judgment.
Usage of the ICJ has fluctuated but never reached a significant level.
During the 1950s, roughly two or three cases were submitted each year.
During the 1960s, the ICJ fell into virtual disuse, with no new cases sub-
mitted from July 1962 to January 1967 or from February 1967 to August
1971. Between 1972 and 1985, usage returned to about one to three cases
per year, and in the last ten years the rate has been roughly two cases per
year. This seems like a paltry amount for a court of first instance from
which there is no appeal, which has jurisdiction over virtually all issues of
international law, and which may be used by nearly every state in the
world. Indeed, international legal academics have complained about the
relatively low usage rate of the ICJ and proposed reforms. "2
The low usage rate no doubt stems in part from the reluctance of
countries to agree to compulsory jurisdiction. Only 64 of the 191 members
of the U.N. currently accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. "3 This
is a participation rate of about 34%. By contrast, thirty-four of fifty-seven
111. Compiled from Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 48, at appendix. Special agreement: 12
Yes; 2 No; 1 N/A. Treaty: 9 Yes; 6 No; 32 N/A. Compulsory: 4 Yes; 6 No; 20 N/A. Date range: 1947-
2003. Jonathan Charney conducted a similar study in 1987 but did not provide complete figures on
noncompliance. See Jonathan i. Chamey, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the
Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 288-319 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
Nonetheless, Chamey found that in ten out of twenty-eight contentious cases (35.7%), states refused to
participate in or comply with an ICJ decision. Id. at 297. Chamey did not, however, distinguish
between cases involving compulsory jurisdiction and jurisdiction by treaty or special agreement, and
his figures do not include cases decided after 1986.
112. See, e.g., Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court,
in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 461-98 (Leo Gross ed., 1976); MERRILLS,
supra note 23, at 164-66, 285-331; MAX PLANCK, INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE, OTHER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION (1974); Arthur W.
Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 31 (Leo Gross ed., 1976); Heidi K. Hubbard, Note, Separation of Powers Within the United
Nations: A Revised Role for the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 165, 168 (1985);
Lyndel V. Prott, The Future of the International Court of.Justice, 33 Y.B. WORLD APP. 284 (1979).
113. These numbers are drawn from documents provided by the ICJ on its website. See
Declarations of Recognition, supra note 110.
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U.N. members (60%) accepted compulsory jurisdiction in 1947V 14 Today,
of the five permanent members of the Security Council, only Great Britain
has accepted compulsory jurisdiction: France, China, the United States,
and Russia have not (nor has Germany)." 5 Among the states that do accept
compulsory jurisdiction, almost all hedge their consent with numerous
conditions." 6 That suggests that state parties to the U.N. Charter have
chosen not to make use of the Court because they cannot control its
outcomes." 17
As for compliance, the Tim McAdams and Tom Ginsburg study finds
that in compulsory jurisdiction cases, states comply with the judgment of
the ICJ only 40% of the time." 8 As Table 4 shows, when the Court
becomes more dependent, its compliance rate rises. When the dispute
arises under a treaty, compliance rises to 60%. When the jurisdiction
comes from special agreement, compliance leaps to 85.7%. In short, the
more closely tied the jurisdiction is to the consent of the involved parties,
the more likely it is that the parties will comply with the judgment."9
An examination of a few cases demonstrates the difficulties that the
ICJ has experienced in achieving compliance with its decisions. One
famous example is the case between Nicaragua and the United States,
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua.2 ' In 1984,
Nicaragua instituted proceedings at the ICJ, claiming that the United States
violated the U.N. Charter and customary international law, by, among other
things, engaging in attacks on Nicaraguan facilities and mining Nicaraguan
ports. '2 Both the United States and Nicaragua had accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36 of the Court's
statute. 12  But three days before Nicaragua filed its application on April 9,
1984, Secretary of State George Shultz declared that the United States
would not accept the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction over any disputes
114. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE YEARBOOK, 1947-1948.
115. See Declarations of Recognition, supra note 110.
116. See id. For examples of hedging, see the declarations of Australia and India.
117. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute
Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-4 (1982); Richard A. Falk, Realistic Horizons for
International Adjudication, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 314, 321-22 (1971). Even as early as 1955, international
legal academics were concerned about the decline in the use of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction clause
and the many reservations that nations used to leave open the option of withdrawing from the ICJ's
jurisdiction if another nation brought a case which they opposed. See C.H.M. Waldock, Decline of the
Optional Clause, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 244.
118. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 48, at 1309-10.
119. As usual, there is a problem of selection effects: maybe states submit only simple or low-
stakes cases by special agreement, and the harder cases arise only under treaties or customary
international law.
120. (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (deciding merits).
121. Id. at 22.
122. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
392, 441 (Nov. 26) (deciding jurisdiction).
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arising out of Central America.1 23 The Court rejected the U.S. attempt to
modify its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction; when it accepted the
jurisdiction in 1946, the United States had stated that it would give notice
six months before any withdrawal could take effect. 24 The United States
then withdrew completely from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. l1 5
The Court's decision on the merits, which appeared in 1986, found the
United States in breach of its international obligations for attacking
Nicaragua and supporting the Contras. 2 6 The United States ignored the
decision.
Refusal to comply with the ICJ has also taken less confrontational
forms. Recently, the United States ignored two ICJ decisions under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 27 Under the Convention, the
United States had an obligation to notify foreign defendants, at the time of
arrest, that they had a right to contact their consulate. 2 8 The United States
is a party to an optional protocol that vests jurisdiction in the ICJ to resolve
disputes over the Convention between parties that have ratified the
protocol. In 1998, Paraguay initiated proceedings against the United States
on behalf of a capital defendant, Angel Breard, a Paraguayan national, who
was to be executed by the state of Virginia. 129 After affirming its
jurisdiction but before reaching the merits, the ICJ issued a provisional
measure-akin to a temporary restraining order-which ordered the United
States to "'take all measures at its disposal to ensure that [Breard] is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings."' 130 When the
Supreme Court took up the case, the United States argued that the ICJ
order was not binding and that the execution could proceed. 3 ' The
Supreme Court denied the petition for a stay of execution, and Breard was
executed.12 The United States simply refused to obey the ICJ's order.133
The United States again refused to comply when the same issue arose
in a dispute with Germany. In that case, two German brothers had been
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona without
123. See id. at 398; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, State Dept. Legal Advisor, Statement to Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (Dec. 4, 1985), 86 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 67 (1986).
124. See Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 398.
125. 24 I.L.M. 1742-45 (1985).
126. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14 (June 27) (deciding merits).
127. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9); LaGrand
Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 40 I.L.M. 1069 (June 27, 2001).
128. Vienna Convention, 1998 I.C.J. at 249 (quoting Vienna Convention, 1998 I.C.J. at 258).
129. Id. at 248; see Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 371 (1998).
130. Breard, 523 U.S. at 374.
131. Id. at 371.
132. Id.
133. For a discussion, compare Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and
the States, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1998) with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding
Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1998).
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notification of their Vienna Convention rights.134 After one of the brothers
was executed, Germany instituted proceedings against the United States in
the ICJ, and again the ICJ issued an order to the United States to take all
measures at its disposal to stop the execution while it heard the case on the
merits.3 3 The executive branch opposed a stay of execution before the
Supreme Court, the Court denied the petition, and the execution
proceeded. 136 Nonetheless, the case proceeded to the merits before the ICJ,
which held that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention and
the ICJ's order, and that the United States, in the future, was to allow the
"review and reconsideration" of the convictions and sentences in cases
where a Vienna Convention violation has occurred. 137 While it could be
argued that "review and reconsideration" is sufficiently broad to be
satisfied by a state clemency process, the United States has not stopped an
execution because of a Vienna Convention defect.13
Failure of the ICJ to achieve compliance is not limited to cases
involving the United States. In the first contentious case to be decided by
the Court, Corfu Channel, Albania refused to comply with the Court's
judgment. 139 After warships of the British Royal Navy struck mines in the
Corfu Channel between Albania and Greece, Great Britain brought a case
for damages against Albania, which had agreed to the Court's jurisdic-
tion. 4 ° After the Court issued judgment against it, Albania refused to par-
ticipate in proceedings on damages and did not pay the amount decided.
Great Britain responded by withholding Albanian gold recovered from the
Nazis, and it was not until 1992, with a change of regime in Albania, that a
settlement was reached and the gold was returned.'4 ' In 1951, Great Britain
sued Iran because Iran nationalized the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company. 4 2 The Court mandated provisional measures to protect the com-
pany and its property, which Iran ignored. Eventually, the Court found it
had no jurisdiction in the case."' In 1955, Portugal brought suit against
India after India suspended rights of passage to two remaining Portuguese
enclaves in the Indian subcontinent.'" The Court ruled in 1960 that
134. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 40 I.L.M. 1069, 1076-77 (June 27, 2001).
135. LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1100-01.
136. F.R.G. v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
137. LaGrand, 40 I.L.M. at 1100.
138. In 2004, the ICJ ruled in a third case that "review and reconsideration" required U.S. courts
to provide a forum for review of violations of the Vienna Convention. Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581 (Mar. 31, 2004).
139. (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLO COURT: WHAT IT IS
AND How IT WORKS 155-58 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that even though the ICJ, in Corfu Channel, ordered
Albania to pay reparations, Albania "never paid the reparation awarded").
140. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 4.
141. ROSENNE, supra note 139, at 44, 181-82.
142. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22).
143. Id. at 115.
144. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12).
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Portugal had a right, under international law, to passage to its enclaves, but
India annexed the territories the following year.'45 Even Iceland, by no
means a powerful country, has refused to comply with the Court's rulings.
In 1972, Great Britain brought proceedings against Iceland because Iceland
expanded its exclusive fisheries zone.146 Iceland refused to appear and dis-
regarded provisional measures. 4 7 Several other cases followed in which
states refused to comply with orders of the ICJ. These states include France
in a case involving its nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific,'4 Iran and its
taking of American diplomatic personnel hostage,' 49 and Serbia in its
support for genocide against the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina.O50
C. Inter-American Court on Human Rights
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR) is another
prominent international tribunal that has had trouble securing compliance
with its decisions. In 1969, several American states adopted the American
Convention on Human Rights, which established the IACHR."5 ' The
Convention entered into force in 1978 and protects primarily political and
civil rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, personal integrity, due
process, privacy, property, equal protection, and freedom of conscience
and expression.' The IACHR started operating in 1979.'13
Before the adoption of the American Convention, human rights in the
Americas were the subject of the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, a nonbinding statement that was adopted at the same time
as the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS).'54 The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights monitored compliance with the
Declaration, primarily by visiting nations and issuing reports about
countries' human rights performance.'
Of the thirty-five American states, twenty-five have ratified the
American Convention, and of those, twenty-one have accepted compulsory
145. ROSENNE, supra note 139, at 189.
146. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
147. ROSENNE, supra note 139, at 207.
148. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 i.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
149. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
150. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 1993 I.C.J. 470 (Oct. 7).
151. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into
force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
152. American Convention, supra note 151, at arts. 3,4,5,6,7,8,11, 12, 13, 21, 24.
153. See Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights [hereinafter IACHR Statute],
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/ser.
L./V./I.4, rev. 9 (2003), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.eng.htm.
154. OAS Int'l Conf. of Am. States, 9th Conf., reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, supra note 153.
155. See Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, What are the Functions and Powers of the
Commission?, at http://www.cidh.org/what.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
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jurisdiction.'56 The United States and Canada have not ratified the
Convention and are not subject to the jurisdiction of the IACHR. The
IACHR is a permanent, relatively independent court. It may hear petitions
alleging a violation brought by either the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights or by a state party to the Convention, but not by an individ-
ual.'57 Under the American Convention, the decisions of the IACHR are
legally binding and not subject to appeal.'58 The Court is composed of
seven judges nominated by state parties to the Convention and elected by
majority vote.'59 The judges serve for six-year terms and may be reelected
once. A state party to a case may appoint an ad hoc judge to ensure its
interests are represented. 1
60
Cases between state parties may arise in one of three ways. A state
may accept the jurisdiction of the IACHR through a general acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction; a limited acceptance of reciprocal jurisdiction in
suits brought by countries that take on the same obligation; or ad hoc
acceptance of jurisdiction in an individual case. 161 Individuals and NGOs
have no authority to bring a suit before the Court directly, but by bringing a
matter to the attention of the Commission, they might prod the
Commission-after investigating, issuing a report, and seeking a
settlement-to submit the case to the Court on their behalf. The Court may
only hear cases involving a claimed violation of the American Convention.
It has the authority to order remedial actions or compensation for
violations. 6a
The Court has presided over relatively few disputes. As of 2000, it
appears to have heard only thirty-two contentious cases and issued only
fifteen judgments.'63 This is a usage rate of 0.07 cases per state per year. As
we will see, this usage rate is much lower than usage of the European
Court on Human Rights. Differing histories may help to explain this dis-
crepancy. One scholar on the IACHR has written:
Whereas the European system has during its forty year history
generally regulated democracies with independent judiciaries and
governments that observe the rule of law, the history of much of
156. Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Brief History of the Inter-American Human
Rights System, at http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004); PHILLIPE SANDS ET
AL., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 217 (1999).
157. American Convention, supra note 15 1, art. 61 (regarding jurisdiction).
158. Id. at arts. 67-68.
159. IACHR Statute, supra note 153, at arts. 4-6.
160. Id. at art. 10.
161. American Convention, supra note 151, at art. 62.
162. See Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 155.
163. See SANDS ET AL., supra note 156, at 217. We counted fifty-five from the annual reports, but
we trust the Sands figure more than our own. See, e.g., 1999 Annual Report of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, OEA/ser. L.V./III.47, doc. 6 (2000), at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts
/iachr/Annuals/annual-99.html (last visited June 4, 2004).
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the Americas since 1960 has been radicially [sic] different, with
military dictatorships, the violent repression of political opposition
and of terrorism and intimidated judiciaries for a while being the
order of the day in a number of countries. [As a result of the recent
political history,] human rights issues in the Americas have often
concerned gross, as opposed to ordinary, violations of human
rights. They have been much more to do with the forced
disappearance, killing, torture and arbitrary detention of political
opponents and terrorists than with particular issues concerning, for
example, the right to a fair trial or freedom of expression that are
the stock in trade [of the ECHR]. 6
There are many cases that have arisen in Latin America in the last twenty-
five years where all should agree that grievous violations of the American
Convention have occurred. 16
5
Compliance with IACHR decisions has been mixed. The IACHR
often orders two types of remedies in a case: (1) the trial and punishment of
offenders within a state party along with changes in domestic law, and
(2) monetary compensation for the complainant. From our survey of the
IACHR's cases, it appears that while states routinely ignore the require-
ment that they punish offenders or change their laws, they have often paid
financial compensation. We have found only one case in which a nation
has fully complied with an IACHR decision. Even in that decision, the
Honduran Disappeared Persons case, the defendant state, Honduras, did
not pay the award until eight years after the Court had rendered its final
judgment. 166 In all the other cases, it appears that nations have not fully
complied, and the Court continues to supervise compliance. 167 This
amounts to a compliance rate of approximately 5%. Interestingly, the
Inter-American Commission, which issues only nonbinding country reports
that seek to convince nations to change their human rights policies, reports
a 4% rate of full compliance with its reports. 168 Thus, not only is there a
low compliance rate with the decisions of the permanent, independent
IACHR, but it does not achieve a significantly higher degree of compliance
than a body that does not even hear cases and has no binding legal
authority under international law.
164. David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievement, in
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 2 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds.,
1998) (internal citations omitted).
165. Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not
Yet an Ox, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 164, at 31, 33-34.
166. See Harris, supra note 164, at 25 & n. 131; see also Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade, The
Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 164, at 133, 138.
167. Harris, supra note 164, at 25 & n.131.
168. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003, OEA/ser.
L./V./I1. 118, doc. 5, rev. 2 (2003), at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003eng/chap.3f.htm (last visited
Aug. 28, 2004).
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If we limit our analysis to the monetary component of IACHR judg-
ments, compliance rates rise, but not to an impressive level. By our count,
states have made full financial compensation in 23.6% of the cases; in
14.5% of cases, no compensation was awarded. In the rest of the cases,
slightly greater than 60%, states.have engaged in either no or only partial
compliance.'69
There are the usual problems with selection effects. Nevertheless,
given the low usage and compliance rates, we can be reasonably confident
in concluding that the IACHR has not been an effective tribunal.
D. GA TT and WTO Adjudication Systems
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) entered into
force in 1947. Initially conceived as a temporary framework for
international trade negotiations, GATT was indefinitely extended when the
United States failed to ratify the treaty creating the International Trade
Organization. GATT's charter did not provide for formal adjudication of
trade disputes. Instead, states submitted conflicts to arbitration under the
auspices of the GATT secretariat.
While the informal arbitration system handled hundreds of disputes
over nearly fifty years, it was not always effective. States could block or
delay the establishment of arbitration panels and the adoption of judg-
ments, and although outright blocking was relatively rare, delay occurred
frequently. Frustration with these practices led to evasion of the system.
States would rely on unilateral retaliation and during many years did not
use the GATT dispute mechanism at all. Dissatisfaction with the arbitration
system, as well as with other aspects of GATT, prompted member states in
1995 to establish the WTO. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding
created a more formal, court-like adjudication system.170
1. Dispute Resolution Under GATT
The GATT system was essentially a formalized arbitration system. If
private consultations between disputing states failed, a party could request
the creation of a panel. Because GATT acted by consensus, either party
could block the creation of a panel. Therefore, as in an ordinary arbitration,
a panel would be appointed only with both parties' consent. The two par-
ties had to agree on the members of the panel, and that could lead to sig-
nificant delay. After the panel heard the case and rendered a judgment, the
169. This is based on our review of the cases as reported by the IACHR's annual reports.
170. For detailed discussions, see William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System, in
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 145-74 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradness Chambers
eds., 2d ed. 2002); ROBERT JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 259-67
(2002); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997).
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GATT members decided by consensus whether the judgment would be
adopted. Again, because both parties' consent was needed, the losing party
could block adoption of the panel's decision.
If a panel's judgment was adopted by GATT members, but the losing
party did not comply, the winner could seek GATT authorization for the
implementation of sanctions. The loser again had the opportunity to block
such authorization. This happened in every case but one.'7 1 Thus, although
losing states did not usually block adoption of a panel's judgment against
them, they almost always blocked authorization of sanctions. The winning
party would then have to decide whether to implement unilateral sanctions,
which was a technical violation of GATT. The United States frequently
threatened unilateral sanctions but rarely implemented them.
In 1989, GATT members eliminated the right to veto the creation of a
panel. However, they retained the right to veto adoption of panel reports,
and the GATT system remained highly dependent, as we define the term.'72
2. Dispute Resolution Under the WTO
The 1995 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) created a system
much closer to a court than the system under GATT. If private consulta-
tions fail, the complaining party can request that the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) appoint a panel. If such a request is made, the DSB, which
consists of all member states of the WTO, must create a panel unless all
DSB members agree not to. Since the complaining state would not ordinar-
ily agree to dismiss its own complaint, this consensus rule effectively
makes appointment of a panel automatic. Although the parties to a dispute
can recommend individuals for the panel, the WTO's Director-General can
appoint a panel if the parties cannot agree. As a result, strategic delay of
the formation of the panel is difficult.
Panels consist of three people who are not nationals of the disputing
parties unless the parties agree otherwise. After a panel hears a case and
renders a judgment, that judgment is adopted by the DSB unless there is a
unanimous consensus against doing so. Again, because the winner is a
member of the DSB and thus can stop any effort to block the judgment,
adoption of the judgment is effectively automatic.
The DSU created an appellate procedure. A standing appellate body
consists of seven individuals who are nationals of different WTO members.
They serve four year terms. Appellate panels usually consist of three of the
members of the appellate body drawn at random. Thus, a national of one of
the state parties will not necessarily hear the case. The appellate body's
decision is adopted by the DSU unless all members agree otherwise.
171. Netherlands Measure of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT
B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32 (1953).
172. Support for this section, Part 1II.D. 1, can be found in PETERSMANN, supra note 170, at 89.
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If the losing party does not comply with a judgment that has been
adopted by the DSU, the DSU may authorize sanctions. Here again, the
consensus rule applies against the losing party. It can avoid sanctions only
if all members of the DSB, including the winner, agree. Thus, obtaining
multilateral authorization for sanctions is effectively automatic.' 73
3. Effectiveness of GATT and the WTO Compared
Because the GATT and WTO dispute resolution systems apply to the
same subject matter-international trade-they provide a valuable oppor-
tunity for evaluating our hypotheses. The GATT system is highly depend-
ent, while the WTO system is highly independent. States adopted the WTO
system because they believed, among other things, that its adjudication
system represented an improvement over GATT. Were they right?
Our first test of the relative effectiveness of GATT and the DSU is
usage. A tribunal that is used often is more successful than a tribunal that is
used rarely. A first look at usage statistics suggests that the WTO system is
superior to the GATT system. There were 432 complaints under GATT
from 1948 to 1994; there have been 313 disputes under the WTO from
1995 through 2003. The GATT system, then, handled an average of 9.2
disputes per year; the WTO system has handled an average of 34.7 disputes
per year. 7
4
Although these raw figures strongly favor the WTO, a fair comparison
of the two systems must control for various factors. The membership in
GATT/WTO has increased rapidly over this time period, and presumably
this led to an increase in the number of disputes. In addition, the GATT
system as a whole, not just the adjudication system, took a while to de-
velop and has been subject to various crises. For example, in the decade
following the establishment of the EC, Europe effectively withdrew from
GATT while it consolidated its gains.'75 If we limit our comparison to, say,
1989 to 1994, GATT's usage statistics look better, with 21.2 complaints
per year. 76 If we control for membership (GATT's mean membership from
1989 to 1994 was 105, while the WTO's was 132), '7 and look at
173. For the details, see PETERSMANN, supra note 170, at 177-91.
174. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, The Evolution of GA TT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in TRADE
POLICY RESEARCH 143, 151 (John M. Curtis & Dan Ciuriak eds., 2003). Note that Busch and Reinhardt
define a dispute as a case in which a complaint is filed (excluding disputes that are resolved before the
filing of a dispute), and they limit disputes to dyads (so three-state disputes count as two disputes). The
data analyzed in the article extend only through 2000, but Marc Busch has generously supplied us with
data through 2003, and the figures are accordingly updated.
175. HUDEC, supra note 35, at 12-13.
176. The higher usage rate after 1989 could be due to the adoption of the 1989 dispute resolution
improvements, which eliminated the power to veto panels. But the power to veto the adoption of panel
reports was retained, so the reduction of dependence, if any, was small.
177. World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last updated Apr. 23, 2004); World Trade Organization, The 128
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complaints per state per year, we find 0.20 complaints per state per year for
GATT, and 0.28 complaints per state per year for the WTO. Finally, if we
control for state pairs,'78 we find 0.0039 complaints per state pair per year
for GATT, and 0.0042 complaints per state pair per year for the WTO. The
difference between these rates is not statistically significant. 7 9
Disputes should arise more frequently as interaction increases so we
should also control for subject matter and trade volume. In addition to pro-
ducing the WTO, the Uruguay round greatly strengthened the international
trade law relating to intellectual property and services. Thus, these topics
were more likely to arise in legal disputes during the WTO era. And, even
within the subject matter areas that remained constant, the increasing vol-
ume of world trade created new opportunities for clashes. Trade among
GATT/WTO members increased by about 38% between 1991 and 1997.18°
In a statistical study comparing usage rates of GATT and the WTO,
Professor Eric Reinhardt found in a study of 704 dispute initiations from
1948 to 1998 that the probability that a developed state would initiate a
dispute against another developed state was higher under the WTO than
under pre-1989 GATT.'' However, because the expansion of international
trade law relating to services and intellectual property occurred at the same
time, one would expect disputes to increase independent of the effects of
the change in the adjudication system.' 2 Insofar as the traditional users of
the dispute settlement system-the developed countries-are concerned,
Professor Reinhardt found no difference in the probability of a dispute un-
der the two systems after controlling for membership, size of economy, 83
countries that had signed GATT by 1994, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/gattmem-e.htm (last
visited Aug. 28, 2004).
178. The formula is n! / [2 * (n - 2)!]. To understand why state pairs provide the appropriate
baseline, compare possible interactions between two states (Wand X), and four states (W, X, Y, and Z).
Among two states, there is only one potential state conflict: between W and X. Among four states, there
are six potential conflicts: W-X, W-Y, Y-Z, X-Y, X-Z, and Y-Z. The number of state pairs, and thus the
number of potential conflicts, bears a nonlinear relationship to membership. For GATT, there were
5460 state pairs. For the WTO, there were 8646.
179. The t statistic is -0.52 (probability > /t/ = 0.61). In contrast, the difference in means for cases
per state per year is significant, at the 10% level. Thus, readers who think that cases per state-year is a
more appropriate measure than cases per state-pair-year should conclude that the WTO system did
increase usage-not counting the expansion of trade volume, as discussed subsequently. The data set
consists of filings per year from 1989 through 2003.
180. Edward D. Mansfield & Eric Reinhardt, Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The
Effects of GA TT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Agreements, 57 INT'L ORG. 829 (2003)
(noting an increase from 6.5 to 9 trillion in 1995 dollars).
181. Eric Reinhardt, Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATTIWTO Dispute
Initiations, 1948-1998, at 19 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
182. Reinhardt did find a substantial (more than threefold) increase in the probability of a dispute
after the 1989 improvements. See id.
183. Hom et al. find that more active traders use dispute resolution mechanisms more frequently.
See Henrik Horn et al., Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?, Centre for Economic
Policy Research Discussion Papers, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP2340.asp (1999).
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and similar factors, including possible bandwagon and feedback effects.'8 4
In sum, usage did not increase and may have declined.
Let us turn to compliance. Between 1995 and 2000, the WTO adjudi-
cation mechanism ruled unambiguously in favor of complainants in forty-
one cases. Of these cases, the defendant complied fully 73% of the time
and complied either fully or partially 88% of the time. In sixty-eight GATT
cases between 1980 and 1994, the defendant complied fully 54% of the
time and complied either fully or partially 76% of the time. 85 The
differences between the WTO statistics and the GATT statistics are not
significant.186
A study confined to EU-U.S. trade disputes found that compliance
was lower under the WTO than under the GATT. Looking just at those
cases in which a ruling was issued in favor of the complainant, compliance
under GATT occurred 63% of the time (ten of sixteen), while compliance
under WTO occurred 33% of the time (two of six). 187
Although these statistics suggest that the WTO system is no better,
and may be worse, than the GATT system, they are hampered by selection
effects. When states decide whether to file a complaint or settle, they take
into account the likelihood that a complaint would lead to a judgment and
that the judgment would cause the defendant to bring its behavior into
compliance with trade law. As a result, a superior system could actually
have lower compliance rates than an inferior system. Under the superior
system, the easier cases settle, and only the harder and more politically
sensitive cases make it to judgment. 18
184. Eric Reinhardt, supra note 181, at 17-21. But see Eric Reinhardt, To GATT or Not to GATT:
Which Trade Disputes Does the US Litigate, 1975-1999? 1, 16 (2003), at http://
userwww.service.emory.edu/-erein/research/tg.pdf (unpublished manuscript). Reinhardt finds that as
judicialization increases, the United States becomes more likely to use GATT/WTO rather than the
unilateral section 301 mechanism. Holding other variables at their mean, the United States is 24% more
likely to use IL after 1989 (GATT), and an additional 23% more likely after 1995 (WTO). See also
Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GA T!WTO
Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 457 (Daniel L.M.
Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
185. We thank Eric Reinhardt for supplying us with these data. They are based on his and Marc
Busch's evaluation of compliance, which supplements Hudec's earlier work on GATT compliance.
Looking at all GATT cases from 1948 to 1994, full compliance after a ruling for the plaintiff occurred
42% of the time; partial compliance occurred 27% of the time; and noncompliance occurred 31% of the
time. See Eric Reinhardt, Adjudication Without Enforcement in GA TT Disputes, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
174, 177 (2001). For reasons given earlier, the 1980 to 1994 data provide a better basis for comparison.
186. We thank Eric Reinhardt for conducting this test for us on his data set. The chi-squared
statistic is 3.9 (probability > chi-squared = 0.14).
187. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: THE EU, THE US, AND THE WTO 465, 480-81
(Emst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003).
188, For an effort to control for domestic political considerations such as election year and the
political power of affected industries, see Todd Allee, Legal Incentives and Domestic Rewards: The
Selection of Trade Disputes for GATT/WTO Dispute Resolution (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
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One way to minimize selection problems is to look further back in the
dispute procedure-at settlement as well as compliance. Although two sys-
tems might have equal compliance rates, the better system should produce
more settlements, and this effect should be reflected in greater rates of con-
cession. Table 5 contains data for concessions granted in response to com-
plaints. These concessions resulted from settlements as well as
complied-with judgments.
Table 5: Concessions in the GATT and WTO Systems'89
None Partial Full Total
GATT 85 (38%) 54 (24%) 87 (38%) 226
WTO 32(21%) 20(13%) 102 (66%) 154
Total 117(31%) 74(19%) 189(50%) 380
The WTO seems superior to GATT. A greater portion of WTO cases
result in full concessions, and a smaller portion result in no concessions.
As noted, however, at the same time that the DSU was created, the
reach of laws governing trade in services and intellectual property
expanded. When the scope of trade law grows, states might initially bring
the easiest disputes-the low-hanging fruit-and these disputes are most
likely to result in substantial concessions. The study from which Table 5
was compiled does not test this hypothesis, but a more limited study of
disputes between the European Union and the United States did. In the
latter study, the statistical significance of the correlation between the
operation of the WTO and the rise in concession rates disappeared after
controlling for cases involving services and intellectual property. 9 ' If these
results hold up in more complete studies of more member states, it will be
difficult to credit the enhanced levels of concessions to the DSU.
The concession data, then, do not show that either system is better
than the other. However, one must worry again about selection effects.
Busch and Reinhardt assume that settlements occur after a complaint is
filed, so their data include only post-complaint settlements. But it is possi-
ble that an injured state and a violator will settle prior to the filing of a
complaint. Suppose that a superior dispute resolution mechanism results in
substantial trade concessions prior to the filing of a complaint because the
threat of litigation is credible. Under such a system, only the most difficult
and politically sensitive cases would proceed beyond the filing stage. An
inferior system might be associated with a higher level of post-complaint
189. Compiled from Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE
719, 725 tbl.1 (2003). These data reflect all GATT/WTO disputes from 1980 through 2000 for which
the authors have outcomes (77% of cases, 380 out of 496 complaints made during this period, in total).
190. Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 187, at 474-75.
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concessions simply because the normal diplomatic bargaining-which
sometimes results in concessions-continues after the complaint, unaf-
fected by the parallel legal proceedings. Thus, the system with the higher
post-complaint concession rate would not necessarily be the better system.
This selection problem might seem unlikely, and Busch and Reinhardt test
for several sources of selection bias and find them insignificant, but the
possibility cannot be dismissed."9 '
A final, potential solution is to consider overall trade flows starting
prior to the dispute. The theory is that if a state either loses an adjudication
and complies with the judgment or eliminates an illegal trade barrier
because of the threat of a complaint, then its behavior should be reflected
in the volume of imports from the complainant. When the illegal barrier is
removed, the volume should increase.
Chad Bown conducted a test using this proxy on a set of disputes in-
volving allegations of excessive import protection from 1973 to 1998.192
The dependent variable is the logarithmic growth rate of the defendant's
imports from plaintiff in the disputed sector from one year before to three
years after the dispute. Bown found no evidence that the WTO adjudication
procedures were more effective than the GATT procedures. His main find-
ing was that an adjudication is more likely to be successful (in the sense of
increasing trade flows) when the complainant has a large share of the
defendant's exports. The retaliatory capacity of the injured state, rather
than the details of the adjudication regime, drives compliance with
international trade law.
Our brief discussion of research on trade adjudication cannot do jus-
tice to the complexity of the subject, and the research itself is at an early
stage, as is experience with the WTO system. The safest conclusion so far
is that WTO adjudication procedures have increased neither the probability
that states will use adjudication to resolve trade disputes nor the likelihood
that states will obey trade law. Accounting for the increase in world trade
and changes in substantive law makes the WTO usage statistics look mea-
ger, and the case for GATT's superiority becomes stronger.
There are many possible explanations for the lack of progress from
GATT to the WTO, and we do not have the space to discuss and evaluate
them.193 Instead, we would like to suggest one possible new hypothesis: the
WTO's court-like dispute settlement system does not necessarily improve
behavior under international trade law and may make it worse.
191. Busch and Reinhardt argue that this is unlikely. Id. at 478-82.
192. Chad P. Bown, On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REV. EcON.
STAT. 811 (2004).
193. See Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 187, at 482-83; see also Busch & Reinhardt, supra note
174; Karen J. Alter, Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes: The WTO's New Dispute Resolution System,
79 INT'L AiF. 783 (2003) (blaming the WTO's legalistic dispute resolution system for increasing
conflict in international trade).
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E. Comparison of Tribunals
In this section, we try to compare the tribunals more directly. We aim
to show that independence and effectiveness are uncorrelated (our weak
thesis) or negatively correlated (our strong thesis). To do so, we need to
assign numbers to our two variables, independence and effectiveness.
To measure independence, we construct a five-point scale, with one
point for each of the five characteristics that distinguish an independent
tribunal from a dependent tribunal. These are: (1) compulsory
jurisdiction; (2) no right to a judge being a national; (3) permanent
body; (4) judges having fixed terms; and (5) right of third parties to
intervene. Table 6 summarizes this information and provides the dates for
the start and (if applicable) termination of the tribunal and the nature of its
jurisdiction. We also supply information for the European courts, the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the International
Criminal Court for purposes of comparison.
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Table 6: Independence of Tribunals 94
Court Start End Juris. Com- No Perma- Term 3d Indep.
pul. Right nent of Party Score
Juris. to Body Judges lnterv. **
Na- of
tionals Judges
Arbitr- 1792* 1979* specific no no no ad hoc no 0
ation dispute
PCA 1899 N/A general no no no ad hoc no 0
PCIJ 1919 1945 general yes no yes 9 no 3
ICJ- 1946 N/A general yes no yes 9 yes 4
comp
ICJ- 1946 N/A specific no no yes 9 no 2
other dispute
or
treaty
GATT 1947 1995 trade no no no ad hoc no 0
ECJ 1952 N/A general yes no yes 6 yes 4
ECHR 1959 N/A human yes no yes 6 yes 4
rights
IACH 1979 N/A human yes no yes 6 no 3
R rights
WTO 1995 N/A trade yes yes yes 4 yes 5
(app)
ITLOS 1996 mar- yes no yes 9 yes 4
time
ICC not int'l yes no yes 9 yes 4
yet crimes
*This sample is from STUYT, supra note 65. Ad hoc arbitration has existed since
ancient times and continues to the present day.
** One point is assigned to each tribunal for each of the following attributes: state
can be bound to ruling without its consent to adjudication; possible that no
national on panel that hears dispute; judges form permanent body; judges' terms
extend beyond a given dispute; third parties may intervene. Maximum score is five
points.
194. The information in this table is compiled from SANDS, supra note 156; the Project on
International Courts and Tribunals website (http://www.pict-pcti.org/); and, where necessary, updated
from the tribunals' websites.
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Next we turn to effectiveness. Table 7 contains information about us-
age and compliance for all of the tribunals.
Table 7: Usage and Compliance Rates'95
Court Years of Cases Subject States Cases Cases/ Compli- Full
Opera- Filed / Year State- ance Com-
tion Years Reputa- pliance
* tion Rate
Arbi- .. 0.15 0.007 good 44-94%
tration
PCA 104 33 88 0.32 0.004 - -
PCIJ 26 36 63 1.38 0.022 bad/mix -
ed
ICJ- 57 30 62 0.53 0.008 bad 40%
comp
ICJ- 57 62 187 1.09 0.017 - 72%
other
GATT 48 298 128* 6.21 0.05 mixed 38%
ECJ 51 12,800 15 251 17 good 82%
ECHR 44 1000s 44 - - good 80%
IACHR 24 32** 21 1.33 0.06 bad 4%
WTO 9 313** 146 34.7 0.28 mixed 66%**
ITLOS 9 10 145 1.11 0.008 -
ICC 1 0 92 - I-
* As of 1994.
** Through 2000.
* Mean used when membership changed over time.
195. Sources are as follows: For arbitration, see STUYT, supra note 65. For PCA and PCIJ, see
Butler, supra note 31. For ICJ, see Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 48. For GATT and the WTO, see
Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 184. For ECJ, see Stacy Nyikos, The European Court of Justice and
National Courts: Strategic Interaction Within the EU Judicial Process, at http://law.wustl.edu/igls/
Conconfpapers/Nyikos.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). For ECHR, see our discussion in Part IV.B. For
ITLOS, see http://www.itlos.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). For ICC, see http://www.icc-
cpi.int/php/show.php?id=home&l=EN (last visited Aug. 30, 2004). For ICJ and PCIJ we exclude
advisory cases; unless otherwise indicated, data are as of 2003 or (for subject states) the end of period
of operation. ECHR data is omitted because of the importance of the 1998 changes. Ad hoc arbitration
data are for 1880 to 1899.
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The evidence is hard to interpret for many reasons. We have already
discussed the problem of selection effects. There are also many problems
of comparison. Is a tribunal that is used rarely but also has a limited juris-
diction more or less effective than a tribunal that is used more frequently
but also has a broader jurisdiction? With these problems in mind, we forge
ahead and combine the tables as follows.
Table 8: Relationship Between Independence and Effectiveness
Independence
Low (0-1) Medium (2-3) High (4-5)
Effectiveness Low [PCA] PCIJ, IACHR ICJ-comp
based on
compliance High arb., GATT ICJ-other [ECJ],
and usage I [ECHR], WTO
As the PCA was essentially redundant with the ad hoc arbitration sys-
tem, it should be excluded. It was not used much because it did not add
anything to the arbitration system. For reasons that we discuss in the next
Part, the ECJ and ECHR should be excluded as well. The WTO, then, is
the best evidence for the view that independence and effectiveness are cor-
related. However, as we argued, the WTO has been no more effective, and
arguably less effective, than the GATT during its last ten years.'96 At a
minimum, there is no evidence for positive correlation between
independence and effectiveness. This is our weak thesis.
Our strong thesis-that the correlation between independence and
effectiveness is negative-is supported by arbitration and GATT (depend-
ent, effective tribunals); by the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction (independent,
ineffective); by the absence of a real example of a dependent, ineffective
tribunal; and by the absence of a real example of an independent, effective
tribunal once the European courts are excluded and the WTO is put aside.
Further supporting our strong thesis is the (partial) evidence of the decreas-
ing effectiveness of the trade tribunal from GATT to the WTO and the evi-
dence of superior performance of the ICJ when its jurisdiction is
consensual rather than compulsory.
IV
EUROPE AND INTEGRATION
European courts pose a challenge to our account of international tri-
bunals. The widespread belief that the ECJ and the ECHR are both
196. The data on GATT in Table 7 are for the entire period of its existence. As we discussed
earlier, GATT's last five or ten years provide a better comparison. See supra text accompanying notes
175-79.
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independent and effective lies behind the conventional wisdom that inde-
pendence is the key to success. In this Part, we argue that the European
courts are more like domestic courts than international courts. Independent
courts can be effective if they exist within a political community. Europe
has such a community'97 ; the rest of the world does not. Therefore, the ECJ
and the ECHR cannot be models for international tribunals.
A. Integration
Domestic judges in advanced liberal democracies are generally
regarded as independent of the parties who appear before them. Their inde-
pendence is not due solely to lifetime tenure: most judges, even in the
United States, do not have lifetime tenure. In the United States, many state
judges are elected, and judges in foreign countries can belong to a bureauc-
racy that is subordinate to elected officials. The reason that judges are
independent is that the parties who appear before them do not pay their
salaries or exercise any control over them. In a well-functioning state, par-
ties are too weak to influence judges. Only when the government is a party
do judges feel pressure to abandon their stance of neutrality, pressure that
many, but not all, judges are able to resist.
If parties cannot influence judges, then they cannot be sure that judges
will decide disputes in an unbiased way. Judges might instead apply ideo-
logical commitments, personal policy preferences, or other criteria that
prevent a decision within the parties' win set. Why, then, do parties volun-
tarily submit their disputes to judges when they could otherwise rely on
nonlegal mechanisms such as nonbinding arbitration? Nonbinding arbitra-
tion is the domestic analogue to international arbitration because, in both
cases, no third-party enforcement mechanism ensures compliance with the
judgment, and arbitrators must please parties if they want to be used again.
However, domestic courts can offer parties something that international
tribunals cannot: a judgment that will be enforced by marshals and police.
Domestic parties thus face a tradeoff. Courts can offer enforcement, but
judges are not as dependent as arbitrators are, and thus can be counted on
to provide less accurate judgments. Parties frequently split the difference
by relying on binding arbitration; courts enforce the awards but refrain
from second guessing arbitrators and review their judgments only for
abuse.
Domestic courts can call on the executive branch (in the United
States) to enforce their judgments only because the executive branch is
willing to enforce courts' judgments. If it were not, then domestic courts
would be helpless and they would rarely be used. It is not entirely clear
why the executive branch obeys the orders of courts, but part of the reason
197. One must keep in mind, of course, that the ECJ and the ECHR encompass different sets of
nations, with only the former being part of the European Union.
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is surely that courts are reasonably reliable and rule based on the law rather
than their own preferences. This, in turn, is due to the training and attitudes
of judges. Judges are chosen from the mainstream political community and
share the values of the main political parties. Elected officials also retain
power over judges: they control their resources, their jurisdiction, and other
elements of their positions.198
By contrast, international courts cannot rely on third-party enforce-
ment. There is no world "executive branch" that can enforce judgments. If,
as we have argued, states comply with international judgments only when
they are within the states' win sets, then compliance will occur only within
the context of the parties' continuing relationship.
A second difference between domestic and international courts is the
legislature. If domestic courts interpret laws badly, misinterpret custom,
overlook important social and economic changes, and so forth, legislatures
can correct them-both by changing the law and by modifying the court
system. By contrast, there is no world "legislative branch" that can reliably
correct the errors of international tribunals. Instead, these errors can be
changed only through consensus, or occasionally, through unilateral action
by a powerful state.
We argue that independent tribunals can be effective only in an insti-
tutional setting where external agents such as executive and legislative
branches of government enforce their judgments and correct their errors.
This setting exists in many states, but it is rarely found in international
affairs. There is, however, an important middle case: when a group of
states forms a union or confederation.
The European Union is not the first such group of states. Germany
prior to unification in 1871 was a confederation, as were the confederated
states of America prior to union in 1789. A confederation or union can be
distinguished from the international realm. In the former, individuals,
elites, or interest groups within the union feel loyalty to their counterparts
in other nations in a way that transcends their national loyalties. When a
confederation has such a political community, it can often legislate new
rules and execute judgments. Only then can a relatively independent
judiciary be effective.
The members of the European Union have developed their own law-
European Community law-to govern their relationships. 9 9 Most legisla-
tion is proposed by the European Commission (consisting of delegates
from each member of the European Union) and adopted by the Council of
the European Union (consisting of ministers from each member of the
198. See JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47-48 (9th ed. 2001) (collecting sources).
199. There is an enormous literature on the European Union and its legal system. A useful
introduction is GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2d ed.
2002).
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European Union, the composition of which varies by issue) and an increas-
ingly influential European Parliament (consisting of representatives that are
directly elected by the European Union's citizens). 2°" Depending on the
topic, the voting system operates on unanimity or majority rule. A large
bureaucracy, the European Commission, implements the decisions of the
Council and Parliament. Although these institutions are far from those of a
regular federal state, they are also far (in the other direction) from the insti-
tutions that are used for normal interstate governance. The EU is most like
other interstate institutions in that it lacks enforcement through an execu-
tive agency. In the following sections we analyze the effectiveness of
European tribunals against this backdrop.
B. European Tribunals
1. European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was established in 1952 as the
judicial body for the European Coal and Steel Community.20 ' It has
remained the principal judicial organ for members of the European
Community even as they have evolved from a loose collection of several
communities2. 2 into the European Union.03 The ECJ settles disputes
between the different actors of the European Union, which includes mem-
ber states; EU institutions such as the Commission, Council, and
Parliament; and sometimes private parties. The ECJ also functions to
ensure the uniform interpretation of European law, and national courts may
refer questions of European law to it.2" Substantive European law derives
from the treaties that have formed the European Communities and the
European Union, the regulations and directives issued by European
Community institutions in exercising the powers conferred to them by the
treaties, and treaties to which the Community is a party. The ECJ is a
200. On the institutions of the European Union see NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 463-493 (5th ed. 2003). A brief overview is also provided by the
European Commission, How the European Union works: A Citizen's Guide to the EU Institutions
(European Documentation 2003), at http://europe.eu.int/comm/publicationsfbooklets/index-en.htm
(June 2003).
201. A number of books are dedicated to the organization and functioning of the European Court
of Justice. See, in particular, EUROPEAN COURTS PROCEDURE (Richard Plender ed., 2d ed. 2001);
ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE (1999); THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE (Griinne de Burca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2001).
202. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/
entoc29.htm; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC),
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm.
203. The three European Communities form the first pillar of the European Union. The second
pillar of the European Union is the common foreign and security policy, and the third pillar is the
cooperation in justice and home affairs. Only the first pillar embodies Community jurisdiction in its
most highly developed form, as described in this paper.
204. See ARNULL, supra note 201, at 21-69.
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permanent court that hears disputes concerning the interpretation and
application of the European Community treaties and secondary laws
created under their authority.2"5
Fifteen judges compose the ECJ,2 °6 the same as the number of member
states. They are appointed for renewable, six-year terms by the unanimous
consent of the member states. By tradition, each member state has one rep-
resentative on the bench. Parties cannot raise objections based on
nationality to the membership of a chamber that hears a case.20 7
The jurisdiction of the ECJ mainly covers three types of cases:20 8
claims brought against member states by the Community for violations of
EC law,2"9 claims brought against Community institutions,210 and referrals
from member states' domestic courts concerning questions of EC law.
Cases against member states for violations of EC law can be brought by
other member states, but this occurs rarely; cases are ordinarily brought by
the European Commission.' Cases under the second fount of jurisdiction
can be brought by member states, other EC institutions, or individuals that
have a direct and particular interest in the outcome.2"2 The third type of
jurisdiction occurs when a question of EC law arises in the domestic pro-
ceedings of a member state's national court. Although the national court
decides whether to seek the referral, the individual parties to the case may
participate in the ECJ proceedings. If a question of EC law arises in the
national court of last resort, it has an obligation to refer the issue to the
ECJ.213 Member states and the Commission may intervene in all cases, and,
with some exceptions, private parties may intervene in cases involving
other private parties.2 4 The member states have an obligation to ensure that
205. For useful discussions of the role of the ECJ, see ARNULL, supra note 201 and THE
EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS
SOCIAL CONTEXT (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
206. The court is assisted by eight advocates general. Their role is to present reasoned opinions on
the cases brought before the court. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7. 1992, art.
222, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992) [hereinafter TEEC].
207. L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 19-21 (5th ed. 2000).
208. It also hears cases by EC staff, interstate disputes brought by special agreement as provided
for by one of the EC treaties, and contract disputes with the Community, among others.
209. Proceedings for failure to fulfill an obligation under TEEC, supra note 206, at arts. 226, 227.
210. Proceedings for annulment of acts adopted by Community institutions under TEEC, supra
note 206, at art. 230, and proceedings for Community institutions' failure to act under various
provisions of the different Community treaties. The latter proceedings are now usually dealt with by the
Court of First Instance.
211. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 207, at 115.
212. See supra note 210.
213. For details on this issue, see ARNULL, supra note 201, at 51-60.
214. In 1989, the Communities created a Court of First Instance (CFI), composed also of fifteen
judges, one from each member state, appointed to six-year terms by unanimous approval of the member
states. The CFI hears cases that arise in the original jurisdiction of the ECJ in staff, coal and steel,
competition, and certain trademark areas. Since 1994, all cases against the Community by individuals
are first heard in the CFI. The European Council decides which classes of cases should be transferred to
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ECJ judgments are enforced within their domestic legal systems.215 Each
member state must designate a national authority whose function is to
enforce ECJ judgments. These characteristics-compulsory jurisdiction,
judges with fixed terms, and a continuing body-make the ECJ an
independent tribunal.
The ECJ receives approximately 500 new cases each year and dis-
poses of roughly that amount, with 907 cases still pending as of 2002.216
From 1998 through 2002, the most recent figures available, the largest
number of cases were referrals for preliminary rulings on EC law by
national judiciaries, with the next largest class being direct actions. 1 7
Direct actions refer to suits before the ECJ challenging a national measure
as a violation of the European Union treaties. While the number of pre-
liminary ruling cases has remained fairly constant, the number of direct
actions has steadily risen from 136 in 1998 to 215 in 2002.218
Compliance by EU member states with ECJ decisions appears to be
significant. One study found that noncompliance with ECJ decisions by
national judiciaries from 1961 to 1995 occurred in only 0.6% of cases, and
efforts to evade compliance by referring the question again or by reinter-
preting the ECJ decision occurred in only 2.9% of cases.219 In 40.9% of the
cases, the litigants voluntarily agreed to forgo further proceedings at their
national courts and immediately implemented the ECJ decision.22 °
Although the compliance rates seem significant at first blush, there is
reason for doubt.221 Some countries commonly conceal evasion with ECJ
decisions or plead problems with implementation.222 At the end of the first
decade of integration under the treaty establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC),223 the ECJ heard a series of cases challenging existing
trade quotas on agricultural products among member states. After a
the CFI. The ECJ sits as an appellate body over cases first heard in the CFI. See CURIA, The Court of
First Instance, http://www.curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index-tpi.htm (last visited Aug. 28,
2004).
215. In the words of one scholar, "the member governments of the EU (multiple principals) assign
to the Commission and the Court (supervisors) the task of enforcing the implementation of and
compliance with EC law, as delegated to the individual member states (multiple agents)." See JONAS
TALLBERG, MAKING STATES COMPLY: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE & THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 77 (1999).
216. See THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT,
STATISTICS CONCERNING THE JUDICIAL ACTIVITY OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE, at http://www.curia.eu.int/
en/instit/presentationfr/rapport/stat/st02cr.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Nyikos, supra note 195, at 29.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., HJALTE RASMUSSEN, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1998).
222. Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 INT'L ORG.
171, 177 (1995).
223. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as
amended by the TEEC, supra note 206.
20051
HeinOnline  -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 59 2005
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
transition period ending in 1969, the quotas were to be abolished and re-
placed with EU-wide marketing organizations.224 Empirical data, however,
on noncompliance is difficult to assemble. There is some anecdotal evi-
dence and commentary that suggest that noncompliance may be more
widespread than the numbers suggest. In one case, France appears to have
defied an ECJ decision requiring elimination of an import quota on ba-
nanas; in another, France announced before the ECJ ruled against it that it
would refuse to comply with a decision requiring it to eliminate a quota on
mutton.1 5 States have sought means of resistance other than outright defi-
ance, such as supporting other governments that defy ECJ rulings or seek-
ing collective efforts to constrain the ECJ either through secondary EC
legislation or even proposals to change the basic EC treaties." 6 One scholar
argues that noncompliance with ECJ decisions has increased in response to
efforts by the European Commission and the ECJ to strengthen enforce-
ment mechanisms during the deepening of the European internal market in
the 1990s. 22 7
According to figures supplied by the European Commission, 8 states
had neglected judgments of the ECJ in infringement cases-cases where
the Commission claims a member state has failed to implement an EU
directive-thirty times by the early 1980s and more than eighty times by
the late 1980s. In regard to member state implementation of the European
Union's internal market measures, the Commission in 1989 reported that
a fundamental problem is compliance with ECJ judgments; that the
increase in infringement proceedings is reflected not only in a less
satisfactory implementation of Community law, but also and more
particularly in a growing number of non-enforced judgments, gives
real cause for concern .... The burden of non-implementation of
the ECJ decisions is particularly felt in the internal market
domain.229
Although international law scholars commonly say that the ECJ has an
almost perfect rate of compliance, noncompliance is not, in fact, that rare.
224. For a brief history of the Internal Market initiatives see JONAS TALLBERG, EUROPEAN
GOVERNANCE AND SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 108-34 (2003).
225. Case 48/74, Charmasson v. Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, [1974] E.C.R. 1383
(banana case); Case 232/78, Commission v. French Republic, [1979] E.C.R. 2729 (mutton case).
226. Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal
Integration in the European Union, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998).
227. TALLBERG, supra note 224 at 34.
228. First Annual Report to the European Parliament on Commission Monitoring of the
Application of Community Law, COM(84)181 final at 27-30.
229. European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Implementation of the
Legal Acts Required to Build the Single Market, in id. at 52-53.
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To date, no comprehensive empirical examination of compliance with ECJ
decisions has been carried out.23°
Despite anecdotal evidence of noncompliance, we think it reasonable
to conclude that the ECJ is an independent tribunal that has relatively high
usage and compliance rates. Indeed, this correlation is the source of the
conventional wisdom that international tribunals' effectiveness increases
with their independence. But because of the strong bonds among EU mem-
bers, the ECJ is not truly an "international court" for purposes of compari-
son with the ICJ, arbitral tribunals, and other courts. The value of tribunal
independence in Europe does not carry over to other international tribunals,
and the relative effectiveness of the ECJ does not disprove our thesis.
The special character of the ECJ, compared to other courts, can be
seen in its daily workings. Virtually none of the ECJ's direct-action cases
involve suits between member states. Rather, most of the direct lawsuits
are brought by the institutions of the European Union itself, particularly the
European Commission, against member states for failure to comply with
their treaty obligations.23 Further, the close integration of the ECJ with the
member states' national judiciaries--questions of EC law are referred by
the domestic courts to the ECJ, and ECJ decisions are often directly
implemented by domestic courts232 -more closely resembles the relation-
ship between local and national courts in a federal system than interna-
tional dispute resolution. The "greater bulk of the court's case load is
generated by preliminary references from national judges responding to
claims made by private actors. 23 3 Indeed, most of the member states
accept the supremacy of EC law, as articulated by the ECJ's decisions, to
national law; this reflects the close interrelationship between national and
EC law.234 However, the level of compliance differs throughout the
230. There are two primary sources for ECJ compliance data. The first is the Commission's
Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law. These reports are available at
http://europa.eu.int/conmm/secretariat-general/sgb/droit-com/index-en.htm (last updated Aug. 25,
2004). The second source of data is provided by the European University Institute's Robert Schuman
Centre for Advanced Studies. These compliance data are available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/
Research/Tools/ComplianceDB/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2004). The European Commission's annual
report lists 105 judgments of the Court of Justice that have not been implemented. Of these judgments,
fifty-three were issued within a year prior to the Annual Report. Of the other fifty-two judgments,
twenty-four were from 2000, while the other twenty-eight were from years dating back to 1991. While
France, Greece, and Italy account for about one-half of the noncompliance, virtually all of the EU
members have failed to comply with at least one ECJ judgment, and a majority of the EU members
have failed to comply with at least five judgments.
231. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 207, at 115.
232. DAVID W.K. ANDERSEN & MARIE DEMETRIOU, REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT (2d
ed. 2002).
233. Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute
Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 AMER. POL. SCi. REV. 63, 65 (1998).
234. Paul Craig, The ECJ, National Courts and the Supremacy of Community Law (2002), at
http://www.ecln.net/rome2002/craig.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
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European Union due to the different constitutional traditions of the
member states.235
The distinctive character of the ECJ has led several observers to char-
acterize it as a "constitutional court" for the European Communities, with
the supreme law being the various EC treaties." 6 These scholars view the
ECJ's primary function as promoting a consistent interpretation and appli-
cation of EC law throughout Europe. This has arisen not through direct
actions between member states but through the mechanism of preliminary
references, which have created an indirect method for private actors to
bring lawsuits challenging member state or EC decisions.237 Indeed,
although the French government, for example, was willing to ignore ECJ
judgments against it, it is not willing to ignore its own domestic courts,
which can order the government to comply with the ECJ judgment. The
governments did not provoke a domestic constitutional crisis by rejecting
the judgments of their own courts because they shared with their courts and
many domestic interest groups the goal of European integration.238 If the
ECJ promoted integration, it was with the acquiescence of the European
governments.
Thus, while we acknowledge that the ECJ provides the best foil for
our thesis and supports the competing hypothesis that tribunal independ-
ence increases effectiveness, we argue that the latter view does not take
account of the special circumstances of Europe. The institutional setting in
which the ECJ operates more closely resembles that of a domestic court
than that of a traditional international court. Moreover, in an integrated
"state" or union, unity comes from the common interests and backgrounds
of citizens and subnational groups, not from the states themselves. This
system cannot be a model for international courts, where relationships
between states are thin and fraught with conflict.23 9
235. DEREK BEACH, BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE AND EU MEMBER STATES (2001).
236. Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone, The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, 26 COMp. POL.
STUD. 397 (1994).
237. See Karen Alter, Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A
Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL
COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 227, 227-28 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
238. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW 217-21 (2001).
239. International relations scholars have different views about the high member-state compliance
with the ECJ. Some of these scholars view the ECJ's decisions as consistent with member-state
interests and have argued that the ECJ promotes these interests (or, in some arguments, the interests of
France and Germany) by solving monitoring and incomplete-contracting problems for the member
states. See Geoffrey Garrett, International Cooperation & Institutional Choice: the European
Community's Internal Market, 46 INT'L ORG. 533 (1992); Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast,
Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market, in IDEAS
AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993). The justices of the ECJ,
subject as they are to renewable terms, wish to increase their power through the expansion of EC law,
but will not issue decisions that deviate from the strong preferences of the most powerful member
states.
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2. European Court of Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights, which was created by
the member states of the Council of Europe, established the ECHR in
1953.240 The ECHR monitors compliance by member states with the
Convention's substantive terms. The Convention protects individual rights,
such as the right to life, the prohibition on torture, and the freedom of
expression and thought, as well as more ambiguous liberties, such as the
right to education and the right to private and family life.241 Initially, the
ECHR filtered cases, deciding whether to attempt mediation or to refer the
case to the Commission of Foreign Ministers of the Council of Europe. If a
referral was made, the complaining state or person could seek binding ad-
judication before the Court. In 1998, the Commission was eliminated, and
the Court became the only institution to hear complaints under the
Convention.242
The ECHR comprises judges equal in number to the member states to
the Convention, which currently is forty-four. 243 The judges serve for
renewable six-year terms. Each state party may nominate three candidates,
who may or may not be nationals, and they are elected by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 4.2  There is neither a
guarantee that every member state will have a national on the Court nor a
Other scholars argue that EC institutions have a more active role. See Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 177 (1998); Martin Shapiro, The
European Court of Justice, in EURO-POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE NEW
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 123 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). These scholars see an alliance of sorts between the ECJ, the
national judiciaries, and private parties that benefit from supranational EC rules; this group is the
driving force behind the expansion in the ECJ's power and jurisdiction. The ECJ's decisions are not
necessarily consistent with the interests of the member states, but the member states have been
unwilling to contain its expansion of authority. See also ALTER, supra note 237, at 41-43.
This argument is distinct from our concern with the dependence of international tribunals; both
arguments assume that the ECJ is independent enough to resist short-term pressures either to violate the
incomplete contract (in the first case) or to refrain from nation building (in the second case).
240. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept.
3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (modified Nov. 1, 1998) [hereinafter European Convention]. For secondary
literature on the Convention, see, in particular, P. VAN DuK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (3d ed. 1998); FRANCIS JACOBS &
ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (3d ed. 2002); J.G. MERRILLS & A.H.
ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (4th ed. 2001).
241. See generally European Convention, supra note 240.
242. This new institutional machinery is based on the provisions of Protocol No. II of the
European Convention on Human Rights. For detail on these changes, see MERRILLS & ROBERTSON,
supra note 240, at 297-325.
243. European Convention, supra note 240, at art. 20.
244. Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, The European Court of Human Rights:
Historical Background, Organisation and Procedure (2003), at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/
HistoricalBackground.htm (Sept. 2003).
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restriction on the number of judges of each nationality. Nonetheless, it
appears that each member state has one representative on the Court.245
The jurisdiction of the Court is broad. After domestic remedies have
been exhausted, any state party, individual, group, or NGO may bring a
suit claiming a human rights violation against one of the member states.246
Originally, a member state could choose not to allow jurisdiction over
itself in cases brought by non-states, but in 1998-at the same time as the
elimination of the Commission-the Court's jurisdiction was made com-
pulsory as to all state parties for all complaints.247 In sum, the ECHR, like
the ECJ, is relatively independent.
Usage of the ECHR has increased steadily in response to the expan-
sions in jurisdiction created through amendments to the Convention. The
annual number of applications had increased from 404 in 1980 to 4750 in
1997.248 The number of cases submitted to the Court itself rose from 7 in
1981 to 119 in 1997.249 In the three years following the 1998 changes, the
number of applications rose from 5979 to 13,858.250 In 2002, the Court
received 28,255 applications and delivered 844 judgments. 2 1 Almost all of
this activity involves cases brought by individuals against their own state,
not state-to-state disputes.25 2 These usage statistics cannot be compared to
those for other international tribunals, which generally do not permit
individuals to bring cases.
The Convention does not require member states to follow any specific
process for bringing their laws or actions into compliance with ECHR
decisions. 3 States have responded to ECHR judgments in several different
ways, including administrative rulemaking, implementation by national
judiciaries, enactment of conforming legislation, and even changes to do-
mestic constitutions. 4 The great majority of state responses, close to 80%,
involve legislative enactments, and legislative and administrative responses
245. JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 240, at 396-400. Currently, the seats of judges in respect of
Latvia and Lithuania are vacant.
246. European Convention, supra note 240, at arts. 34, 35(1).
247. Id. at art. 34. Formerly, individual applications had to be accepted separately under Article 25
of the original Convention.
248. Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Survey of Activities 2002, at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/2002SURVEY.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, I Eur. H.R. Rep. 617, 618 (1976).
254. Case studies describing the various means of implementing ECHR decisions include DONALD
W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(1997). Implementation is also discussed in J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2d ed. 1993) and VAN DUK & VAN HOOF,
supra note 240.
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together amount to 91% of the state responses. 55 The ECHR has no
method of enforcement in cases where a state party to a case refuses to
comply.
256
Although some commentators suggest that the ECHR enjoys high
levels of compliance,257 we cannot find good data to corroborate these
assertions.2 58 By the middle of 1999, the Court had addressed more than
1000 petitions, nearly all of them initiated by private parties. 9 More than
670 were adjudicated on the merits, with more than 460 resulting in a find-
ing of a violation of the Convention.2 6' The Court claims that member
states have consistently paid damages when ordered to do so, but it also
reports only 294 cases in which states have altered their domestic laws to
comply with an ECHR decision.26' If each decision on the merits required a
change in domestic law, these figures imply a compliance rate of roughly
64%. This estimation is highly imprecise; it is unclear what percentage of
human rights violations, if any, might be the result of actions of
government officials that are ultra vires of existing law.
Another means of judging compliance is through the so-called Article
41 action, which permits plaintiffs who do not receive full compensation
from the losing member state to seek additional redress. 262 According to
one study covering the years 1960 through 1995, Article 41 claims
occurred in 48 out of 292 cases (16.4%) in which the ECHR found a
255. Christopher Zorn & Steven R. Van Winkle, Government Responses to the European Courts
of Human Rights 10 (2001), at http://www.polisci.emory.edu/zorn/papers/zomistanbul.pdf (last
visited Aug. 18, 2004).
256. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25 (1978).
257. See Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics of the New
ECHR Control Mechanism, as Established by Protocol No. 11, Signed on II May 1994, 15 HuM. RTS.
L.J. 81, 82-83 (1994) (citing examples of compliance); J6rg Polaciewicz & Valeie Jacob-Foltzer, The
European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: The Impact of the Strasbourg Case-Law in
States Where Direct Effect Is Given to the Convention, 12 HuM. RTS. L.J. 65 (1991) (same); Andrew
Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe, I
EUR. J. INT'L REL. 157, 171 (1995). For more formal efforts to measure compliance, see Christopher
Zorn & Steven R. Van Winkle, Explaining Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights
(2000), available at http://www.polisci.emory.edu/zorn/papers/zvwpsa.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
We find the data more ambiguous than they do. The first paper has a regression in which the dependent
variable is whether a person brings a claim for compensation against a state, not whether a state
complies or not. The second paper's regression measures states' choices among responses to a finding
of noncompliance-administrative, legislative, judicial, or constitutional-but not whether the response
was adequate rather than merely formal.
258. The ECHR provides some statistical data on its caseload and judgments but does not attempt
to measure compliance. For a general discussion of the difficulty of measuring compliance, see Oona
A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 11l YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
259. ECHR Survey of Activities 2003, at 34, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/edocs/
2003surveycourt.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
260. Id.
261. Effects of Judgments or Cases, 1959-1998, at http://www.echr.coe.int/engledocs/
effectsofjudgments.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
262. European Convention, supra note 240, at art. 41.
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violation of the Convention.263 The percentage of cases that generated
Article 41 claims was initially quite high: in 1970, more than 50% of all
judgments finding a violation were followed by Article 41 claims, and that
number hovered around 50% until the early 19 8 0s .2' That number dropped
below 24% by 1995.265 But, in the interim, a procedural change combined
Article 41 claims into the actual merits decision,266 so it is difficult to
determine contemporary levels of compliance.
To sum up, we do not know whether compliance with ECHR judg-
ments has been high or low. We also cannot say whether usage has been
high or low compared to that of international tribunals. Although the
ECHR caseload of hundreds compares favorably to, say, the IACHR's
caseload of dozens, millions of people may file cases with the ECHR,
whereas only a handful of states may file claims with the IACHR. The
usage rate for the ECHR might therefore seem comparatively paltry. For
these reasons, we do not think the ECHR provides strong evidence for the
conventional wisdom that ties independence to effectiveness.
C. Summary
We know that independent tribunals-tribunals that do not depend on
the goodwill of the parties that appear before them--can be effective
within a state. When the government has a monopoly on the legitimate use
of force, when it will use this monopoly to enforce judicial orders, and
when it can legislate in cases where judicial lawmaking goes awry, inde-
pendent tribunals can do much good. These conditions are not met in the
interstate case, where nothing prevents a state from ignoring tribunals
except a general concern for reputation and fear of retaliation from coop-
erative partners. The ECJ (not the ECHR) poses a challenge to our argu-
ment only if it is properly considered an adjudicator of truly interstate
disputes rather than conflicts that arise within a state-like union or confed-
eration. We believe that the relationship between states within the
European Union is closer to the relationship between, say, Illinois and
Indiana, than the relationship between Indonesia and Peru. European states
share a legislative body, a bureaucracy, and a decades-long commitment to
political unity. Other states do not.
In our view, the degree of political unity is the causal factor. When
states are not unified, only dependent adjudicators can be effective. As
states become more unified, greater independence for adjudicators be-
comes possible. 67 The conclusion of Andrew Moravcsik, although only
263. See Zom & Van Winkle, supra note 255, at 5.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Garrett & Weingast, supra note 239, at 178-87, argue that the ECJ has been willing to serve
the interests of powerful European states because its judges have renewable terms and thus have an
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about human rights enforcement, is general: "[t]he most effective institu-
tions for international human rights enforcement rely on prior sociological,
ideological and institutional convergence toward common norms.
'
"268
Although there are surely complex feedback effects, the weight of the evi-
dence supports our story. The ICJ has not brought the world together; why
should we think that the ECJ has brought Europe together?
V
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEWER TRIBUNALS
In this Part, we draw on our earlier conclusions to predict the fate of
two, relatively new international tribunals: the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
Designers of these tribunals seem to have taken the opinions of inter-
national legal scholars to heart and have sought to provide them with a
high degree of institutional independence. The aim is to increase the
courts' legitimacy and ultimately their ability to achieve compliance. As
indicated in Part III, we believe that these efforts to guarantee independ-
ence through permanent judges and compulsory jurisdiction will lead to
low rates of usage and compliance.
A. International Criminal Court
The ICC was created by the Rome Statute, which was opened for sig-
nature in 1998 and entered into force on July 1, 2002, when the required
sixty states had ratified.269 Under the treaty, the ICC has jurisdiction over
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. After further negotia-
tions are completed, it will have jurisdiction over aggression. 7 ° The ICC
could hear cases, for example, on the deliberate targeting of civilians by
commanders, the torture and execution of prisoners of war, or the system-
atic effort to destroy a national, racial, or ethnic group. Prior to the estab-
lishment of the ICC, enforcement of the laws of war depended primarily on
domestic legal systems, and states generally have been reluctant to punish
their leaders or former leaders for war crimes.271
Rather than resolving disputes between states, the Court adjudicates
prosecutions of individual defendants. The prosecutions are brought by a
incentive to please their masters. As we would put it, the judges are sufficiently dependent on the
goodwill of the parties, albeit much less than conventional arbitrators are. Because Europe is relatively
integrated, adequate judicial performance requires less dependence than in the interstate case.
268. Moravcsik, supra note 257, at 178 (emphasis omitted).
269. See Rome Statute, supra note 42. A useful reference work is WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2001).
270. Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 124, 125
(2001).
271. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 160, 168 (2d ed. 2001).
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special international prosecutor, who can pursue crimes (1) committed by
a national of a state party or (2) committed by the national of a non-state
party that occur on the territory of a state party.272 While focused on indi-
vidual conduct, the Rome Statute makes an important nod to states. It
incorporates the principle of "complementarity," which provides that the
Court will not hear a case if a state party with jurisdiction investigates or
prosecutes the conduct in good faith.2 73 If, however, the prosecutor can
show that the state has conducted its investigation or prosecution in bad
faith, he or she can bring the case to the ICC.
The Court is composed of eighteen permanent judges that are elected
by an assembly of the state parties for nonrenewable terms of six or nine
years or renewable terms of three years. 4 All judges must be nationals of
the state parties.275 The prosecutor is selected by the state parties for a non-
renewable, nine-year term.27" The state parties have no control over what
investigations the prosecutor undertakes, what prosecutions he or she
brings, or how trials are conducted. The prosecutor's decisions on these
matters are, however, subject to review by the Court itself.277
The ICC is apparently independent of the United Nations Security
Council. Recent war crimes tribunals, such as the ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia 278 and Rwanda,27 9 were created by the Security Council.
Proponents of the ICC believed, however, that the veto enjoyed by the
permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Great Britain,
Russia, and the United States) would undermine the universality of interna-
tional criminal justice by allowing them to exempt themselves and their
allies from the jurisdiction of a new court.28° While the Security Council
may refer cases to the ICC prosecutor and may delay prosecutions for
renewable twelve-month terms, it may not actually prevent an ICC case
from going forward.28'
Despite the trappings of autonomy, the ICC, like all other inter-
national tribunals, relies on the goodwill of states. The ICC prosecutor has
no independent authority to conduct investigations, gather evidence, inter-
view witnesses, or arrest suspects on the territory of state parties. Instead,
the prosecutor must ask state parties to perform these functions on its
272. Rome Statute, supra note 42, at art. 12(2).
273. Id. at art. 17(1)(a).
274. Id. at art. 36.
275. Id. at art. 36(4)(b).
276. Id. at art. 42.
277. Id. at arts. 15(4), 110(2) (Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
278. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
279. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
280. Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 90
(2003).
281. Rome Statute, supra note 42, at art. 16 (permitting deferral of investigation or prosecution).
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behalf.282 In addition, the prosecutor must request that state parties surren-
der individual defendants for transfer to the seat of the Court.283 The efforts
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to
gain jurisdiction over Slobodan Milosevic illustrate the difficulties on this
point. It was not the ICTY's demands that led to his apprehension and
transfer but rather the United States' military and diplomatic pressure on
Serbia, including a threat to withhold a half-billion dollars of aid from the
International Monetary Fund and the United States.284 The Rome Statute
does not provide for any sanction if a state party obstructs the prosecutor's
efforts. This has led some commentators to argue that the ICC prosecutor's
institutional weakness could undermine the Court.28
We predict that the ICC will not be an effective tribunal. Although the
Rome Statute is aimed at individual defendants, the ICC's jurisdiction
strikes at the heart of state interests. Prosecutions will inevitably raise
questions about the legality of a decision by a state to use force and the
legality of the tactics used by a state under international law (both jus in
bellum andjus ad bello). As Professor Madeline Morris has observed, "[iun
ICC cases in which a state's national is prosecuted for an official act that
the state maintains was lawful or that the state maintains did not occur, the
lawfulness or the occurrence of that official state act.., would form the
very subject matter of the dispute." '286 In addition, states with military
forces that operate abroad will fear that soldiers and their commanders,
including the highest political authorities responsible for military activities,
will be dragged in front of an international court for war crimes prosecu-
tion and will, at a minimum, be inconvenienced and embarrassed. Indeed,
because the definitions of international crimes are so vague, soldiers and
officials might find themselves punished for activities that they consider
legal and routine.287 Because of these concerns, the United States not only
has withdrawn its signature from the Rome Statute but also has launched
an aggressive diplomatic campaign to protect American soldiers and
civilians from its reach.288
The withdrawal of the United States, a blow to the ICC, can be traced
directly to the independence of the court; the lack of an American veto that
282. See Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1648-49 (2003).
283. Rome Statute, supra note 42, at art. 89.
284. Goldsmith, supra note 280, at 93.
285. See Danner, supra note 282, at 1648-49; Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New
International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 415 (2000).
286. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 21 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
287. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 194
(2001).
288. See Human Rights Watch, Bilateral Immunity Agreements (2003), available at http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/bilateralagreements.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
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could be used to block prosecution of Americans or the nationals of allies
was decisive. 89 As the nation that has taken the lead in conducting peace-
keeping and humanitarian missions throughout the world, the activities of
the United States would have been particularly vulnerable to the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC. The other major states that conduct military activities or
have strong military concerns have also refused to ratify the Rome Statute.
These states include China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Israel.29 ° Like the
United States, these states will pressure state parties not to extradite their
nationals to the seat of the ICC if those nationals are found on the state par-
ties' territory. Although not all states will bow to this pressure, those that
do will be in violation of their obligations under the Rome Statute. Indeed,
those that have signed bilateral immunity agreements with the United
States arguably are already failing to comply with their commitments.2 9
As time passes and more states put pressure on other states to violate
their ICC obligations under the ICC, we predict that the only remaining
state parties will be states that do not conduct significant military activities
on foreign territory. We also predict that most state parties will not comply
with the extradition requirements. War criminals will appear before the
ICC only in those rare cases where they are nationals of a defeated state
whose new government seeks to acquire international legitimacy.
Operations like those performed by the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribu-
nals--classic ex post tribunals whose jurisdictions and powers are defined
after the events, so that the states that establish them may immunize them-
selves-may in the future be performed by the ICC. But this simply means
that, with its wings clipped, the ICC will become just another dependent
international tribunal.
B. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
The ITLOS was created by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which concluded in 1982, and went into force
in November 1994.292 The ITLOS first sat in 1996. UNCLOS, which cur-
rently has 143 parties, created two related international regimes: one gov-
erns the development of the resources of the international seabed through
an organization, the International Seaboard Authority; and the second deals
with the traditional uses of the sea, such as navigation rights and rights in
territorial seas.293
289. Leigh, supra note 270, at 126-29.
290. Human Rights Watch, Rome State Ratifications (May 3, 2004), at http://www.hrw.org/
campaigns/icc/ratifications.htm.
291. Human Rights Watch, Bilateral Immunity Agreements, supra note 288.
292. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS]. For background, see generally GUDMUNDUR EIRIKSSON, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (2000).
293. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 292.
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The ITLOS is a permanent court with jurisdiction over all questions
arising under the UNCLOS. The Tribunal consists of twenty-one inde-
pendent members, who are elected for renewable nine-year terms by the
state parties to the Convention.294 Judges are to represent the world's dif-
ferent legal systems and geographic regions. If a state party to a dispute
does not have a judge of its nationality on the tribunal, it may-as with the
ICJ-appoint an ad hoc judge for that case.295
Under Article 287 of the UNCLOS, nations must file a declaration
that commits them to a mechanism for resolution of disputes regarding the
laws of the sea. They can choose from four options: the ITLOS, the ICJ,
arbitration, or resort to a special arbitration panel.296 If every party to a dis-
pute has chosen the ITLOS as its forum, then the group has effectively
opted for compulsory jurisdiction, and any one of the parties may send the
dispute to the Tribunal.297 State parties may also reach an ad hoc agreement
to submit a particular dispute ex post, or class of disputes ex ante, to the
ITLOS.29 8 State parties with a legal interest in a dispute between two other
parties may move to intervene in the adjudication. 99
Articles 297 and 298 permit nations to make exceptions to their decla-
rations accepting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The exceptions include
cases involving violations of the Convention that are authorized under
international law, which clearly is meant to encapsulate the right to self-
defense, military activities, and law enforcement activities. There are two
categories of cases, however, in which accession to the UNCLOS creates
mandatory jurisdiction over a dispute between state parties. Under Article
292 of the Convention, one state party may seek adjudication in the ITLOS
if another state party has detained its vessel and crew in violation of the
Convention. Under Article 187, the ITLOS has compulsory jurisdiction
over seabed disputes.3 °°
There has been little activity during the Court's seven years of opera-
tion. There is only a single active case pending on the ITLOS docket. °1
The Court has heard only ten disputes overall, five of which were claims
for prompt release of a nation's crew or vessel that fall within the
294. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Annex VI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 3 & 5),
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last modified July 1, 2004) [hereinafter ITLOS].
295. Id.
296. UNCLOS, supra note 292, at art. 287. Special arbitration refers to arbitration over specified
types of disputes. Id. at annex VIII.
297. Id. at art. 287(4).
298. Id. at art. 288(2).
299. ITLOS, supra note 294, at art. 31.
300. UNCLOS, supra note 292, at art. 187.
301. Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific
Ocean (Chile/European Community), Case No. 7, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Nov.
24, 2004).
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Tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction.3"2 Although the ITLOS has existed for
only seven years, given the large number of state parties and the potentially
broad jurisdiction-theoretically, every detention of a ship or crew by a
state party could give ground for a suit-one would expect to see a higher
usage rate. We do not yet have compliance rates for the ITLOS.
Early indicators suggest that the ITLOS will not be an effective inter-
national tribunal. Our explanation should by now be familiar. Because of
the independence of the tribunal, states have little influence over how it
resolves disputes. They cannot expect outcomes that are satisfactory to
both parties, and thus they cannot expect widespread compliance. If com-
pliance is likely to be weak, there is little point in using the Tribunal in the
first place.
CONCLUSION
Scholars who favor the trend toward the judicialization of inter-
national law argue that international dispute resolution bodies should
become more "court-like." Some, such as Professor Thomas Franck, claim
that adjudication by authentic international courts contributes to the legiti-
macy of international law, without which international cooperation is
difficult or impossible to achieve.3"3 Helfer and Slaughter argue that inter-
national tribunals are effective when they decide cases based "on principle
rather than power."" These scholars are just a few members of an aca-
demic consensus that holds that independence enhances the effectiveness
of international tribunals and spreads the rule of law in international affairs.
We believe that this reasoning is based on inadequate evidence. We
have found no evidence that independent tribunals are more effective than
dependent tribunals, and some evidence that the reverse is true, that inde-
pendent tribunals are less effective than dependent tribunals. The primary
difference between our view and the conventional wisdom can be summa-
rized as a dispute about the direction of causation. The conventional wis-
dom holds that independent tribunals lead to political unification. We argue
that political unification makes independent tribunals possible. In the inter-
national realm, where there is no political unification, international tribu-
nals cannot be both independent and effective. This is not to claim, as some
have, that international tribunals serve no useful purpose. As we have
explained, international tribunals can help states resolve disputes by
providing information on the facts or rules of conduct. But they must act
consistently with the interests of the states that create them.
302. These cases are listed on the ITLOS website, http://www.itlos.org (last modified July 1,
2004). Although the website lists twelve numbered cases, two of them appear to involve the same
parties and subject matters as two others.
303. See FRANCK, supra note 15, at 29-33.
304. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 13, at 314.
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Our arguments also explain why international adjudication is frag-
mented rather than unified like a domestic legal system. By limiting the
jurisdiction of international tribunals, states maintain control over how they
decide cases. When particular adjudicators and tribunals act against the
interest of states, states can pressure them or stop using them without
bringing down the whole system and affecting adjudications in other areas
of international relations. This would be impossible if a single international
supreme court controlled the entire international legal system.
Why has the conventional wisdom gone astray? A possible answer is
that international law scholars have mistakenly seized on Europe as a
model whose lessons can be easily generalized to the international sphere.
We suspect that this mistake has been compounded by a false domestic
analogy. It is often argued that the U.S. Supreme Court helped bring about
national unity by asserting its supremacy in Marbury v. Madison."5
Although this story has been criticized, it retains power over the legal
mind, which aspires to solve political conflicts as much possible through
the rule of law.3" 6 International law scholars seized on this analogy and
claimed to find a similar process occurring in Europe through the ECJ.3 °7
The final step has been to argue that international courts can perform the
same function for the whole world.3 °8 This logic is flawed. What might
have happened in a small, homogenous republic at the beginning of the
nineteenth century can hardly be expected to repeat itself at the inter-
national level. Likewise, Europe's experience with the ECJ cannot be rep-
licated in a world that lacks the European Union's institutions and the
shared ambitions of its members.
Much depends on this debate. Taking independence as the causal
variable, Helfer and Slaughter reason that ineffective international institu-
tions such as the U.N. human rights committees should be transformed into
courts, Although they acknowledge the existence of constraints, they
believe that more independent, court-like committees would be more effec-
tive than the existing committees.3"9 By contrast, we argue that granting
international tribunals independence before political unification has been
achieved is likely to weaken them and prevent them from accomplishing
the modest good that they can otherwise do. This is not just an academic
argument. The creators of the new international courts of broad
jurisdiction-the ICC, the WTO, and the ITLOS-have followed the
305. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
306. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Larry D. Kramer,
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REv. 4 (2001). But see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo,
The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 887 (2003).
307. See G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 595 (1989); see also ALTER, supra note 238, at 19.
308. A recent example of this view is Martinez, supra note 21, at 436-45.
309. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 13, at 388-89.
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conventional wisdom and sought to guarantee their success by granting
them independence. Our analysis suggests that these three courts will have
diminished chances of success, and the steps being taken by states to avoid
or weaken their jurisdiction supports our claim. Although it is too soon to
tell whether these institutions will succeed or fail-and their success or
failure will depend on many factors-we argue that weakening their inde-
pendence would, while limiting their potential for doing great things, also
increase the chance that they will survive long enough to do some modest
good.
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